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Trusts No More: Rethinking the Regulation of
Retirement Savings in the United States
Natalya Shnitser ∗
The regulation of private and public pension plans in the United
States begins with the premise that employer-sponsored plans
resemble traditional donative, or gift, trusts. Accordingly, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
famously “imports” major principles of donative trust law for the
regulation of private employer-sponsored pension plans. Statutes
regulating state and local government pension plans likewise
routinely invoke the structure and standards applicable to donative
trusts. Judges, in turn, adjudicate by analogy to the common
law trust.
This Article identifies the flaws in the analogy and analyzes the
shortcomings of a regulatory framework that, despite dramatic
changes in the nature of modern pension benefits, still regards
employees as gift recipients, grants both settlor and trustee rights to
employers, and relies increasingly on trust-based fiduciary
obligations to prevent employers from prioritizing the interests of
their non-employee stakeholders over the interests of pension
plan participants.
Today, the mismatch between the trust-based legal framework
and the parties’ rights and interests has contributed to the high cost
of pension fund investing, the significant gaps in pension coverage,
and the underfunding of public pension plans. As such challenges
force U.S. policymakers to reconsider how and how much Americans
save for their retirement, this Article shows that long-term
retirement security for U.S workers requires a fundamental
reevaluation of the employer, employee, and government roles in the
provision and management of retirement assets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The donative trust, though often lauded for its flexibility and
fiduciary regime, is an ill-suited model for modern employer-based
retirement savings arrangements. Historically devised for the transfer
of private wealth, the prototypical donative trust arises from and is
structured to effectuate a particular kind of gift transfer in which the
gift giver selects a third-party trustee to manage the gift on behalf of
the gift recipient. The protection of the gift giver’s preferences is a
central goal of modern trust law. 1
1. See, e.g., 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650 (noting trust law’s “attendant emphasis
on carrying out the instructions of the settlor”).
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Pension benefits are not gifts. To the contrary, they are a form of
deferred compensation paid by employers to recruit and retain
employees. And yet the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) famously “imports” major principles of donative
trust law, including the fiduciary regime traditionally imposed on
trustees. 2 Statutes regulating state and local government pension
plans likewise routinely invoke the structure and standards
traditionally applicable to donative trusts. The “trust” label has
invited legislators and judges to regulate and adjudicate by analogy
to the traditional donative trust. 3 In its 2015 Tibble v. Edison
decision, the Supreme Court urged the Ninth Circuit to determine
the scope of the employer’s monitoring obligation while
“recognizing the importance of analogous trust law.” 4
The reliance on the trust form in employer-sponsored pension
savings arrangements constitutes part of the trust’s under-analyzed—
and increasingly problematic—“secret life.” 5 Leading trust treatises
acknowledge the appropriation of the trust label outside the donative
context but refuse to assess the merits of such non-traditional uses of

2. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1988); see also John H. Langbein, The
Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 169
(1997) (noting that “ERISA’s legislative history makes clear that Congress meant to track the
common law of trusts”).
3. See, e.g., Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101 (2007) (noting that
determination as to the employer’s liability “is an inquiry that is aided by the common law of
trusts which serves as ERISA’s backdrop”); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496
(1996) (“[W]e recognize that these fiduciary duties draw much of their content from the
common law of trusts, the law that governed most benefit plans before ERISA’s enactment.”);
Cent. States v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) (“[R]ather than explicitly
enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked
the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibility.”);
Definition of the term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice,
81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2510, and 2550)
(“ERISA safeguards plan participants by imposing trust law standards of care and undivided
loyalty on plan fiduciaries, and by holding fiduciaries accountable when they breach
those obligations.”).
4. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1829 (2015).
5. Langbein, supra note 2 at 166 (“It will be seen that well over 90% of the money
held in trust in the United States is in commercial trusts as opposed to personal trusts.”); see
also Paul B. Miller, The Future for Business Trusts: A Comparative Analysis of Canadian and
American Uniform Legislation, 36 QUEEN’S L.J. 443 (2011); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust As
“Uncorporation”: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 34 (2005) (observing that
“the business trust is something of an orphan in the domestic legal academy”).
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the trust form. 6 Scholars have analyzed—and criticized—the initial
adoption of the trust form for the traditional defined benefit privatesector pension plans prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s. The changes
in the pension landscape over the last two decades, however, have
rendered the analysis incomplete.
Trust law was not intended to play a major role in the
governance of U.S. public and private pension plans. When Congress
borrowed from donative trust law in the 1970s, it did so for the
limited purpose of curbing asset mismanagement—or “internal
defalcation”—by insiders with access to funds set aside to pay
employee pensions. 7 At the time, employers generally promised
traditional defined benefit pensions to their employees, and also bore
the risk and responsibility of setting aside and managing the money
to pay for such benefits. In passing ERISA, Congress looked to trust
law to protect pension assets, but simultaneously imposed extensive
vesting, funding, and insurance requirements to regulate employer
conduct in the provision and administration of defined benefit
pension plans.
Trust law—and particularly the fiduciary regime—inadvertently
assumed a much greater governance role as the pension landscape
evolved in the decades after ERISA’s passage. As defined benefit
plans in the private sector gave way to defined contribution
arrangements, and as defined benefit public pension plans expanded
in size and coverage, 8 many of ERISA’s substantive provisions lost
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003)
(“The law relating to the use of trusts as devices for conducting business and investment
activities outside the express private- and charitable-trust context is not within the scope of this
Restatement. Although many rules of trust law may also apply to business and investment
trusts, many of these rules do not; instead other rules are drawn from other bodies of law that
are specially applicable to those activities even when conducted in trust form. Thus, the
business trust is a business arrangement that is best dealt with in connection with business
associations; and most pooled investment vehicles are properly governed by laws applicable to
investment companies and to the issuance and sale of securities.”). The Uniform Trust Code is
also directed “primarily at trusts that arise in an estate planning or other donative context,” but
acknowledges that “express trusts can arise in other contexts . . . . Commercial trusts come in
numerous forms, including trusts created pursuant to a state business trust act and trusts
created to administer specified funds, such as to pay a pension or to manage pooled
investments. Commercial trusts are often subject to special-purpose legislation and case law,
which in some respects displace the usual rules stated in this Code.” UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 102 cmt. (2000).
7. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2 at 1110.
8. In a defined contribution plan, an employee’s benefits during retirement are not
fixed, but depend on the contributions made by the employee and/or employer to the
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relevance. At the same time, employee participants became
increasingly exposed to the plan management, investment, and
funding decisions of their employers. In the absence of applicable
substantive regulation, the trust-based fiduciary regime took on a
prominent role in regulating employer and employee conduct in the
provision of retirement benefits.
Is trust law well suited for this leading role? This Article suggests
that the answer is no. The structural differences that have emerged
between traditional donative trusts and modern pension plans
undermine the effectiveness of trust law’s protective fiduciary regime
and its ability to safeguard the retirement security of
America’s workers.
In the prototypical donative trust, an owner of property, called
the settlor, wishes to gift the property to one or more beneficiaries.
Rather than giving a direct gift to the beneficiary, the settlor wishes
to have the property managed by a third party serving as trustee. 9
The settlor enters into a management agreement with the trustee
and transfers to the trustee the legal title to the property. The
settlor’s rights with respect to the trust property terminate, the
trustee retains legal control, and the beneficiary receives an equitable
interest. The beneficiary cannot easily transfer the equitable interest
or exercise meaningful control over the trustee. 10 To protect the
beneficiary from trustee misconduct, trust law subjects the trustees

employee’s account, as well as the investment performance of the assets in that account. An
employee in a defined contribution plan will ultimately receive the nonforfeitable accrued
balance in his or her account, which is based on contributions plus or minus investment gains
or losses. In contrast, a defined benefit plan promises a specified monthly benefit at retirement,
which is typically based on the final average salary and the number of years worked for a
particular employer. While an employee may have to contribute a portion of his or her earnings
to a defined benefit plan, the employer is responsible for managing the assets and ensuring that
the benefits will be paid. See also infra Part II.
9. The settlor, trustee, and beneficiary roles do not necessitate three different persons
as parties to the trust. One person can wear two hats, or sometimes even all three. The trustee,
however, must owe equitable duties to someone other than himself. UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 402 (2000).
10. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J.
CORP. L. 565, 570–71 (2003) (observing that “donative trust beneficiaries are awarded their
stake in the trust by the donative fiat of the settlor, and there is no well-developed aftermarket
for the beneficiaries’ interests . . . . Moreover, trust beneficiaries cannot easily replace the
trustees. Both of these limits on the beneficiaries’ control are designed to give effect to the
preferences of the settlor, thereby facilitating the donative trust’s often (but not exclusively)
paternalistic function.”).
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to strict fiduciary obligations, including the duty of loyalty and the
duty of prudence.
Non-donative trust arrangements—including pension plans—
deviate from these characteristics in fundamental ways. The
traditional settlor, trustee, and beneficiary roles do not map well
onto modern pension arrangements; instead, both employers and
employees take on elements of each role. Under existing regulation,
employers do not have to establish any kind of pension plan for their
employees. They take on the “settlor” role of setting up a plan only
if the benefits to the employer—typically in the form of recruitment
and retention gains—exceed the employer’s costs. And just as
employers share the beneficiary role with employees, by contributing
a portion of their compensation to the pension plans, employees take
on the settlor role alongside employers.
The trustee role is also shared by employers and employees.
Employee participants in defined contribution plans choose how to
invest their retirement assets from among investment options
selected by their employers. Participants in public-sector defined
benefit plans have certain voting rights with respect to the selection
and oversight of plan trustees. In both the public and private sectors,
pension law tasks employers—who have a clear interest in
maximizing the benefits to the employers—with certain trustee-like
responsibilities over the plans. 11 Thus, as the settlors, employers
decide whether or not to establish a pension plan in the first place,
and set both the terms of the plan and the magnitude of any
employer contributions to the plan. As the trustees, employers must
then disregard their own beneficiary interests and serve as fiduciaries
of the employee-beneficiaries.
Despite these overlapping roles, the governance of modern
pension plans relies heavily on the tools of trust law, and especially
the trust-based fiduciary regime. As this Article suggests, however,
the current trust-based governance regime for pension plans does
not—and could not—properly recognize the interests and incentives
of employers and employees. The traditional donative trust is
premised upon the existence of clearly defined settlor preferences
and provides no mechanism for adjudicating between competing
interests of settlors, particularly where such settlors are also the
beneficiaries of the trust. The current trust-based regime therefore
11.
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necessarily oversimplifies the interests of the parties to the pension
trust. The statutory framework and case law regard employees as
beneficiaries, while sweeping over their role as earners of the assets
that are contributed into the trusts. The same trust-based framework
treats employers as both the settlors and the trustees of the pension
trusts, but effectively ignores their interest in minimizing the
employer costs associated with the plans.
In the case of defined contribution plans, which are the
dominant form of retirement savings today, the notion of the
employer as a fiduciary to its employees has been in tension with the
fiduciary obligations owed to the corporate shareholders.
Enforcement of the employers’ fiduciary obligations to employees
has been limited by the courts’ deference to the preferences of
employers as settlors, while the employee-as-beneficiary framework
has perpetuated the kind of beneficiary “lock-in” characteristic of
donative trusts. By restricting employees to the pension plan terms
selected by a particular employer, the trust-based framework has left
employee “beneficiaries” at the mercy of their employer “trustees”
for critical decisions regarding the management and investment of
money set aside for retirement. Although such limitations may be
appropriate for gift recipients, they have inappropriately caused
employees to forego hundreds of millions of dollars in investment
returns as a result of suboptimal investment menus and serviceprovider arrangements constructed by the employers. 12 Meanwhile,
the trust-based “gift” paradigm has also led to significant gaps in
coverage. With many private U.S. employers choosing not to provide
the “gift” of pensions to their employees, some sixty-eight million
workers are without access to an employer-sponsored plan. 13

12. See Chris Arnold, Is Wall Street Eating Your 401(k) Nest Egg?, NPR (Oct. 19,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/19/445322138/is-wall-street-eating-your-401-knest-egg (noting that “Americans collectively are losing billions of dollars a year out of their
retirement accounts because they’re paying excessive fees”); infra Section IV.A.2.
13. See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees,
80 Fed. Reg. 72006 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510); see also
Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and
Trends, 2012, EMP. BENEFITS RES. INST, No. 293, Nov. 2013, at 9,
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_011-13.No392.Particip.pdf (noting that “[a]mong
the 156.5 million Americans who worked in 2012, 76.0 million worked for employers or
unions that sponsored a pension or retirement plan, and 61.6 million participated in a plan,”
which translates into a sponsorship rate of 48.6 percent).
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In the case of public-sector pension plans, most of which still
take the traditional defined-benefit form, the trust-based fiduciary
regime has failed to ensure that government promises of pension
benefits are actually funded. The tenets of donative trust law have
not limited the ability of legislative “settlors” to make payout
promises that greatly exceed the trusts’ assets, with the current gap
approaching several trillion dollars. 14 As in the private defined
contribution arrangements, the donative trust model has deferred to
conflicted trustees while treating employees who make contributions
into the pension trusts as gift recipients with limited control over the
trust assets or their interests in the trusts.
To be clear, analogizing to trust law may improve participant
outcomes in certain cases and, under the status quo, it may be at
times the best strategy for plaintiffs seeking to challenge employer
actions (or inaction). 15 In the long-term however, the donative trust
paradigm fails to facilitate universal access to low-cost retirement
savings products, which is critical to retirement security in the
United States. After reviewing the range of recently enacted and
proposed reforms—all of which implicitly acknowledge the
limitations of the current trust-based model—this Article suggests
that the fiduciary regime, though reflexively invoked by the trust
label, 16 should no longer be the centerpiece of retirement plan
governance. Drawing on lessons from the regulation of investment
companies, this Article outlines a research agenda for a national
system of individual retirement savings accounts to track and
administer individual retirement savings throughout an individual’s
lifetime and across all employers. As it has done in other
jurisdictions, the individual account system would free employers
from their trustee roles. Public and private employers would
continue to make contributions on behalf of employees but would
14. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The Crisis in Local Government Pensions in the
United States, in GROWING OLD: PAYING FOR RETIREMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL MONEY
MANAGEMENT AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 47 (Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2011).
15. See, e.g., Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Tibble v.
Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015) (No.13-550), 2014 WL 7783960 (citing extensively to
trust law authorities to show that participants’ claims are not barred by ERISA’s statute of
limitations because ERISA fiduciaries, like donative trust trustees, have an ongoing duty to
monitor plan investments).
16. Langbein, supra note 2 at 182 (noting that “the trust automatically invokes the
distinctive protective regime of trust fiduciary law for safeguarding the interests of investors or
other beneficiaries”).
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not be tasked with plan design or administration. Employees would
select from among readily comparable options the investments for
their retirement account assets. Instead of relying primarily on
fiduciary law to discipline pension plan providers, the individual
account model would treat pension plans as products subject to
safety and standards regulation, and, in turn, to the disciplining
power of consumer choice.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes how donative
trust law came to govern modern pension plans and compares the
traditional donative trust to modern day retirement savings
arrangements. Part III reviews the existing scholarship and explains
the need for a revised assessment. Part IV shows how the reliance on
the donative trust model of regulation has contributed to the high
cost of pension fund investing, the gaps in pension coverage, and the
underfunding of public pension plans. Part V analyzes recently
proposed and enacted changes and introduces long-term reforms to
properly recognize employer, employee, and government incentives
in the provision and management of retirement assets. Part VI
concludes.
II. HOW DONATIVE TRUST LAW CAME TO GOVERN MODERN
PENSION PLANS
How did the trust—long considered the characteristic device for
organizing intergenerational wealth transmission—come to play such
a prominent role in the regulation of public and private pension
plans? 17 What made trust law an appealing model for the Treasury,
for state legislators, and for the drafters of ERISA? The answer lies in
two prominent features of the common law trust: first, its ability to
shield a pool of assets for a particular purpose or person, 18 and
second, the protective regime of trust fiduciary law. 19 Each feature is
discussed in turn below.

17. See Langbein, supra note 2 at 165.
18. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United States. A Basic
Study of Its Special Contribution, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 133, 134 (1998) (arguing that “the
most important contribution of the law of trusts is that it facilitates the partitioning of assets
into bundles that can conveniently be pledged separately to different classes of creditors. Of
particular importance in this respect is the use of trust law to shield trust assets from claims of
the trustee’s personal creditors.”).
19. Langbein, supra note 2, at 182.
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A. The Donative Trust
A trust is an arrangement in which a settlor engages a trustee to
manage property as a fiduciary for one or more beneficiaries.
Although that definition does not in itself situate the trust in any
particular context and, indeed, variations of the trust form have been
adopted for a wide range of commercial purposes, in the culture of
Anglo-American law, the trust is considered a branch of the law of
gratuitous transfers. 20 Having originated at the end of the Middle
Ages as a means of transferring wealth within the family, the trust
remains the characteristic device for organizing intergenerational
wealth transmission and is regarded as “essentially a gift, projected
on the plane of time and so subjected to a management regime.” 21
In a prototypical trust, a settlor wishes to gift property to a
beneficiary. Under the Uniform Trust Code, a settlor is “a
person . . . who creates, or contributes property to, a trust.” 22 Often
the intended beneficiary is a minor or someone who the settlor
believes may not be well suited to manage the property. 23 Therefore,
rather than make a gift directly to the beneficiary, the settlor places
control of the property in the hands of an intermediary to manage
the property on behalf of the beneficiary. Trust law permits the
settlor, as the owner of the property with absolute freedom to give it
away as he or she prefers, to effect almost any management and
distribution arrangement that the settlor desires. 24 Importantly,
however, unless the settlor explicitly retains an interest in the trust,
the settlor’s legal interest in the trust terminates once the trust
is formed. 25

20. Id. at 165.
21. Id. at 185 (citing Bernard Rudden, John P. Dawson’s Gifts and Promises, 44 MOD L.
REV. 610, 610 (1981) (book review)).
22. If more than one person creates or contributes property to a trust, each person is a
settlor of the portion of the trust property that is attributable to that person’s contribution and
that may only be revoked by that person. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 (2000).
23. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2 at 1114.
24. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 401 (2000). Deviation from either an administrative or
dispositive term of the trust is generally permitted only where such deviation will further the
purposes of the trust. Id. § 412; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (AM. LAW INST.
2003); see also Langbein, supra note 2, at 184.
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94 cmt. d(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2003)
(“Neither the settlor of a private trust nor the personal representative or successors in interest
of the settlor can, as such, maintain a suit against the trustee to enjoin or redress a breach of
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Upon the formation of the trust, the beneficiary acquires an
equitable interest in the trust while the trustee acquires the legal
title. The assets in the trust are segregated from both the assets of
the beneficiary and the assets of the trustee. 26 The beneficiary can
neither freely transfer the trust interest, 27 nor, under the default trust
rules, replace the trustee without court approval (and even then,
only for cause). 28 Indeed, to enforce the trustee obligations, the
beneficiary must pursue remedies in court. 29 These limits on control
and exit promote the donative trust’s “paternalistic function.” 30
In the resulting arrangement, the beneficiary’s fortunes depend
on the trustee: if trust property is managed wisely, the beneficiary
reaps the gains, and if the trust property is managed poorly, the
beneficiary suffers the losses. In the absence of market-based checks
on the trustee, the beneficiary of the modern donative trust is
protected primarily by trust fiduciary law—particularly the duties of
prudence and loyalty—which have replaced historic restrictions on
trustee authority. 31 The duty of prudence requires the trustee to
administer the trust “as a prudent person would, in light of the

trust or otherwise to enforce the trust, absent contrary legislation. This does not, however,
preclude settlor-standing based on a retained beneficial power or interest.”).
26. See, e.g., Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 18 at 134, 145.
27. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 962 (2005) (“There is no counterpart in trusteeship to the
market for corporate control . . . . Interests in trusts are commonly inalienable, both on
account of legal restrictions and because of practical impediments to valuing and marketing
contingent interests.”); Sitkoff, supra note 10, at 570 (noting that “there is no well-developed
aftermarket for the beneficiaries’ interests” and that “in many American trusts the beneficiaries
are disabled by so-called ‘spendthrift’ clauses from alienating (even involuntarily) their interest
in the trust”).
28. See e.g., JOHN R. PRICE, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING 1165 (2d
ed. 2000) (noting that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the judicial removal of a
trustee unless the trustee has engaged in an egregious breach of trust”).
29. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(a) (2000) (“The settlors, a cotrustee, or a beneficiary
may request the court to remove a trustee, or a trustee may be removed by the court on its
own initiative.”); id. § 1001(b) (setting forth the remedies that a court may impose for a
breach of trust).
30. Sitkoff, supra note 10 at 571; John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers:
A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1272 (2014)
(noting that settlors impose restrictions in order to protect beneficiaries from themselves or
from others).
31. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 641 (1995) (“The need for active administration of the modem trust portfolio of
financial assets rendered obsolete this scheme of disempowering the trustee to transact with
the trust property.”).

639

05.SHNITSER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

8/4/2016 6:38 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

purposes, terms, and other circumstances of the trust” and with the
“exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution.” 32 The duty of loyalty
demands administration solely in the interest of the beneficiary and
prohibits the trustee from self-dealing with trust assets and from
partaking in any conflict-of-interest transactions. 33 In addition to
making voidable all transactions in which the trustee has a conflict,
the loyalty standard also includes the duty of impartiality, which
applies if the trust has two or more beneficiaries. In deciding how to
invest, manage, and distribute the trust property, the trustee must
act impartially and “giv[e] due regard to the beneficiaries’
respective interests.” 34
In sum, the quintessential donative trust facilitates the
conditioned transfer of gifts, and in particular, the intergenerational
transfer of family wealth. Although various commercial enterprises
have adopted modified versions of the trust form and have relied on
certain elements of trust fiduciary law, pension funds have gone the
furthest in structuring multiparty commercial arrangements by
analogy to the private donative trust. As Section II.B. infra
describes, key elements of the law developed primarily to regulate
the behavior of donative trust settlors, beneficiaries, and trustees
now permeate the statutory regime governing U.S. pension plans.
B. Private-Sector Defined Benefit Pension Plans
The use of the trust form for private-sector pension
arrangements dates as far back as 1919 when the Bureau of Internal
Revenue conditioned the deductibility of employer contributions for
accrued pension expenses on the segregation of those contributions
in a trust “organized entirely separate and distinct from the
corporation . . . legal title of which [could] not remain in the

32. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
33. The duty of loyalty is prophylactic in its approach. Langbein, supra note 31, at 656.
It presumptively makes voidable any transactions in which the trustee acts for its own account,
unless the conflict of interest is authorized by the settlor, approved by the beneficiaries, or
granted advance judicial approval. Barring such approval, once the beneficiaries prove the
existence of self-dealing, there is “no further inquiry.” See, e.g.¸ UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 cmt.
(2000) (“Such transactions are irrebuttably presumed to be affected by a conflict between
personal and fiduciary interests. It is immaterial whether the trustee acts in good faith or pays a
fair consideration.”).
34. Id. § 803 (2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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corporation.” 35 The Revenue Act of 1921 further required that
pension trusts wishing to avoid taxation be created “for the exclusive
benefit” of the employees. 36 Thus, preferential federal tax treatment
was conditioned on the use of the trust form to segregate the assets
for employee pensions from the general assets of the employer.
The tax rules did not, however, impose substantive restrictions
on the nature of pension benefits. Indeed, most employers that
offered pensions to their employees paid them out of current
income, took careful precautions to retain the right to change or
terminate benefits, and intentionally referred to such benefits as
“gifts” whose continuation depended on the fortune of the
employer. 37 To the extent that pensions encouraged younger
employees to stick with an employer (through vesting requirements)
and older employees to retire, they were seen by employers primarily
as means of “managing workers.” 38
Employer interest in pensions soared during World War II when
the National War Labor Board restricted increases in cash
compensation. 39 In the post-war period, employers typically adopted
defined benefit pension plans that promised their employees fixed
monthly benefits—a check in the mail—from the time of retirement
until death. Despite such promises, in the 1950s and 1960s, many
employers failed to set aside adequate assets to pay for the promised
benefits, often leaving employees empty-handed when financial
fortunes turned south. 40 To the extent money was set aside, it made
for a tempting target for unscrupulous insiders with access to the
funds. Evidence of looting by union leaders charged with pension

35. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 25 (2004).
36. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), Pub. L. No. 42-98, 42 Stat. 227, 247.
37. Standard boilerplate plan language included the following:
The allowances are voluntary gifts from the company and constitute no contract and
confer no legal rights upon any employee. The continuance of the retirement
allowance depends upon the earnings of the company and the allowances may at any
time be reduced, suspended, or discontinued on that, or any other account, at the
option of the Board of Directors.
JOHN LANGBEIN, DAVID PRATT & SUSAN STABILE, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 9
(5th ed. 2010).
38. WOOTEN, supra note 35, at 4.
39. LANGBEIN, supra note 37, at 13.
40. Id. at 51–79.
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fund administration made headlines in the national press and helped
usher in a movement for pension reform. 41
The reform effort culminated with the passage of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974. ERISA sought to
address three main risks associated with defined benefit plans in the
private sector: first, that plan officials would steal or misuse plan
pension fund assets; second, that employees would lose their
pensions if they were fired or quit before meeting the extensive and
idiosyncratic vesting requirements commonly imposed by employers;
and third, that employers would not set aside enough money to pay
for the promised benefits, thus endangering the benefits of
employees whose firms terminated the plan or went bankrupt. 42 To
address the latter two risks, ERISA mandated minimum funding
standards, required plans to participate in a termination insurance
program, and imposed minimum vesting standards that granted
employees “a legal right to benefits” after a period of service
specified in the statute.” 43
To address the looting and mismanagement that had previously
plagued private pensions, the drafters of ERISA turned, in part, to
trust law, whose common law fiduciary regime had evolved to
protect beneficiaries from mismanagement by trustees. 44 Although
some have described this move as a mere afterthought, added only in
later versions of the bill, 45 the final version of ERISA incorporated
the “rules and remedies similar to those under traditional trust
law.” 46 The trust-law duty of loyalty became the centerpiece of

41. As Fischel and Langbein note, “In the 1950s and 1960s, investigative hearings on
the subject of labor union racketeering . . . achieved immense notoriety.” Fischel & Langbein,
supra note 2, at 1110.
42. WOOTEN, supra note 35, at 5.
43. Id.
44. Fischel & Langbein observe that the drafters sought to protect pension funds
against “internal defalcation.” Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1110.
45. Frank Cummings, Panel Discussion, ERISA and the Fiduciary, Symposium, ERISA
at 40: What Were They Thinking?, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 359, 376 (2014) (noting that the
fiduciary provisions were essentially stapled on after the substantive rules had already been
drafted); see also Henry Rose, Panel Discussion, Setting the Stage: History Before the NinetyThird Congress, Symposium, ERISA at 40: What Were They Thinking?, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 265,
280 (2014) (noting that early bills “didn’t attend to fiduciary issues in any detail”).
46. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 295 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5076.
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ERISA fiduciary requirements. 47 The drafters of ERISA also
incorporated the prudent man standard of care for trust
administration and the requirement that plan assets be diversified. 48
Though controversial, the trust-based fiduciary regime was
relatively inconsequential in the context of defined benefit pension
plans. ERISA’s substantive rules significantly limited the discretion of
defined benefit plan administrators. For example, not only did
ERISA subject plan sponsors to statutory funding requirements and
a mandatory federal insurance scheme, it also sought to limit the
misuse of plan assets by explicitly prohibiting transactions between
an employee benefit plan and parties that had a pre-existing
relationship with the plan. 49 Although such transactions would also
be prohibited under the fiduciary standard, ERISA’s drafters chose
to rely on an explicit ban rather than a mere fiduciary obligation.
Indeed, the prohibited transaction provisions, together with the
mandatory vesting, funding, and insurance rules, reflected the
understanding that trust law alone was inadequate to protect the
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. 50
The role of the fiduciary regime was also limited by the very
design of the then-prevalent private-sector defined benefit pension
plans. Employee pension benefits were generally fixed as a
percentage of salary (for example, sixty percent of final average
salary) and did not depend on the investment returns generated by
the trust assets. Employers bore the investment risk and were subject
to statutory funding requirements and a mandatory federal insurance
scheme. The asset management practices that the trust-based
fiduciary regime was intended to regulate were “seldom of concern”
to participants in defined benefit plans. 51
47. See e.g., Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy
of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 462 (2015).
48. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1008.
49. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
50. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“After all, ERISA’s standards
and procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the common law
of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection.”); 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650
(“[E]ven where the funding mechanism of the plan is in the form of a trust, reliance on
conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries.”).
51. John H. Langbein, The Conundrum of Fiduciary Investing under ERISA, in
PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES 132
(Dan M. McGill ed., 1989); see also Norman Stein, Trust Law and Pension Plans, in PENSION
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES 52 (Dan M.
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C. Private-Sector Defined Contribution Pension Plans
Over the last four decades, private-sector employers have
gradually ceased to offer defined benefit plans and have shifted to
employer-sponsored, employee-directed arrangements. 52 Today,
employees shoulder the investment risk and bear the costs of
imprudent or self-serving employer decisions with respect to the
design and management of the plans. Under the typical 401(k)
participant-directed plan, employees elect to defer pre-tax earnings
to what are effectively individual investment accounts. 53 Employers
may also make contributions to the employees’ accounts. Employees
then select how to invest the funds in their accounts using menus of
investment options and terms selected by their employers. However
the investments perform, the employees bear the entire investment
risk: at retirement, employees are entitled to receive only the
amounts that have accumulated in their individual accounts.

McGill ed., 1989) (noting that “it is possible that the employer has the ability to pass a part of
[the poor returns and of capital losses] to the employee-participants either by reducing wages,
future benefit accruals, or other concessions.”).
52. Scholars like Edward Zelinsky posit that ERISA unintentionally “started the trend
toward the defined contribution society as we know it today.” See Edward A. Zelinsky, The
Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471 (2004). He argues that ERISA’s
“regulatory burdens” on defined benefit plans made the “more flexible defined contribution
devices . . . more attractive to employers.” Id. at 471–72. Also, “ERISA’s fiduciary rules
incented employers to shift to self-directed defined contribution arrangements under which
participants control the investment of their own retirement resources.” Id.; see also Alicia
Munnell, Private Sector Defined Benefit Plans Vanishing, MARKETWATCH.COM (Dec. 30,
2011),
http://blogs.marketwatch.com/encore/2011/12/30/private-sector-pensions-arereally-disappearing/ (observing that defined benefit plans in the private sector are disappearing
and noting that only 13 Fortune 100 companies offered new employees a traditional defined
benefit plan in 2011, compared to 58 in 2000). The assets held in defined contribution plans
have grown from $385 billion in 1990 to approximately $6.5 trillion by 2015, with $4.5
trillion held in 401(k) plans. See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities
Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1983 (2010); Investment Company Institute,
Retirement
Assets
Total
$23.5
Trillion
in
Third
Quarter
2015,
https://www.ici.org/research/stats/retirement/ret_15_q3.
53. Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) permits employees to defer
recognition of the amounts contributed into the plans and of the investment gains until such
amounts are distributed from the plan, typically upon retirement. Employer contributions are
deductible on the employer’s federal income tax return to the extent that the contributions do
not exceed the specified contribution limitations. I.R.C. §§ 404, 415 (2012). Although this
Article refers to 401(k) plans, the same analysis generally applies to 403(b) plans and 457
plans. IRC § 403 and IRC § 457 provide for similar salary-deferral arrangements for public
schools, certain 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations, and state and local governments.
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Though not designed for such plans, ERISA’s donative trust
framework nevertheless applies. The statute and corresponding
regulation generally require that plan assets be held in trust by one
or more trustees and used only to benefit the participants or to pay
reasonable plan expenses. 54 Moreover, because ERISA extends its
trustee-like fiduciary standards to anyone that has discretionary
authority or control respecting management of plan assets, or
discretionary authority or responsibility in the administration of the
plan, employers assume fiduciary status with respect to the plan.55
The 401(k) arrangement also adopts the lock-in feature of the
donative trust. 56 Just as donative trust beneficiaries generally cannot
transfer or sell their trust interests, 401(k) participants cannot assign
or alienate benefits. Employees are severely restricted in their ability
to withdraw money from 401(k) plans while employed by the plan
sponsor. 57 Nor can employees simply avoid the plan terms selected by
their employers by setting up Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs). 58 If an employer provides any kind of retirement plan, then

54. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 403–04, 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012) (Section 403(b) provides limited exceptions to the
trust requirement).
55. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)
(2012). For a discussion of recent efforts to “outsource” fiduciary responsibility, see infra note
96 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Anne M. Tucker, Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage of Citizen
Shareholders, 125 Yale L.J. F. 163 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/locked-inthe-competitive-disadvantage-of-citizen-shareholders (emphasizing that “exit is not a viable
option” for participants in 401(k) plans).
57. Rules under IRC § 401(k)(2)(B) restrict the distribution of assets from 401(k)
plans. Distributions may not be taken unless the employee severs employment, dies, becomes
disabled, faces certain hardships, turns 59 1/2, meets reservist deployment requirements, or if
the plan itself is terminated by the employer. 26 U.S.C. § 72(t)(2) (2012). Distributions that
do not meet these terms are subject to immediate taxation, as well as additional 10% tax. 26
U.S.C. § 72(t)(1) (2012). Apart from the tax consequences, certain distribution options are
left to the discretion of the plan sponsor. Employers decide, for example, whether or not to
permit hardship distributions or distributions to employee participants who have attained the
age of 59 1/2. IRC § 401(k)(2)(B)(i)(IV); Treas, Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii).
58. The regulation of IRAs is also the subject of great debate, albeit one that is not
explored in this Article. The Department of Labor has expanded the definition of “fiduciary”
under ERISA to include, for the first time, those who provide investment advice to IRA
owners. Notably, the regulation permits “fiduciaries” who meet certain conduct and disclosure
requirement to continue to operate with conflicts of interest. See definition of the term
“Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946,
(Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2510, and 2550).
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its employees cannot access the same federal tax benefits outside the
employer plan. 59
Most importantly, because ERISA provides relatively fewer
substantive rules for defined contribution plans, trust-based fiduciary
obligations now play a far greater governance role. 60 As discussed in
Section IV below, employers, together with other service providers
who exercise discretionary control or authority over the management
of plan assets, are subject to the “catchall” fiduciary obligations of
loyalty and prudence, the scope of which is commonly determined
by analogy to the donative trust. 61
D. Public-Sector Pension Plans
Trust law also figures prominently and problematically in the
management of U.S. public pension plans, which today cover
approximately twenty-seven million public-sector employees,
retirees, and beneficiaries. 62 Although state and local governments
are increasingly experimenting with defined contribution
arrangements, for now, most public plans are defined benefit
arrangements that promise fixed monthly benefits to retirees. 63
59. The Individual Retirement Account (IRA) does permit individuals to save for
retirement in individual tax preferred accounts that are not associated with any employer.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CAT. NO. 15160X, PUBLICATION 590: INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT
ARRANGEMENTS (IRAS) 7 (2013). However, the Internal Revenue Code limits the maximum
contributions to such plans (below the limit for contributions to employer sponsored plans)
and limits the deductibility of such contributions. See id. at 14.
60. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 99 MINN. L.
REV. 15 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2581329 (observing that for defined contribution plans, “ERISA
regulation is of a more modest character”); see also Dana M. Muir, Revenue Sharing in 401(k)
Plans: Employers as Monitors?, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 485, 487 (2014) (noting that “the
governing fiduciary framework has not adapted to the increased importance and complexity of
401(k) plans”).
61. Dana M. Muir, Decentralized Enforcement to Combat Financial Wrongdoing in
Pensions, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 46 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the American
Business Law Journal) (describing ERISA’s fiduciary provisions “as an indispensable catchall to
prohibit harmful conduct that is imprudent or contrary to the best interests of participants but
is not otherwise prohibited by the statute or regulations”).
62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS
AND SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589043.pdf.
63. Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, and Mark Cafarelli, Defined Contribution
Plans in the Public Sector: An Update, CENTER FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOV.
EXCELLENCE (2014).
http://www.nasra.org/files/Topical%20Reports/Plan%20Design/Defined_Contribution_Pla
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ERISA explicitly does not cover public pension plans, but the
trust form is statutorily mandated by most state and local
governments, who both make the pension promises and are also in
charge of putting aside the money to fund such long-term
obligations. 64 To manage and administer pension plans, state and
local governments typically set up pension systems, which are
separate legal entities governed by boards of trustees. 65 The trustees
are either appointed by elected officials or elected by plan
participants. 66 By statutory design, the trustees are charged with
“plan administration” and, in most cases, given discretion over the
investment of assets set aside in public pension trusts. 67 Although
exact statutory requirements vary across states, public plan trustees
are generally subject to the traditional trust law duties of prudence
and loyalty. 68 In cases of alleged fiduciary breach, state courts have
ns_An_Update.pdf (“Most state and local workers are covered by a traditional defined benefit
plan”). Such benefits are often calculated through a formula that considers final salary and
years of service. For example, a worker might be entitled at retirement to two percent of final
average salary for each year worked. An employee who has worked for thirty years for the
particular employer would be entitled sixty percent of her final average salary; an employee
whose final average salary was $50,000 per year would be entitled to $30,000 per year in
pension benefits, not counting retiree healthcare benefits.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2012) (“The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to
any employee benefit plan if (1) such plan is a governmental plan.”). Because ERISA’s funding
requirements do not apply to public pension plans, state and local governments write their
own rules for pension funding and administration. See, e.g., Natalya Shnitser, Funding
Discipline for U.S. Public Pension Plans: An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Design, 100
IOWA L. REV. 663, 668 (2015); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. g (AM.
LAW INST. 2003) (“Some forms of trusts that are created by statute, especially public
retirement systems or pension funds . . . are administered as express trusts, the terms of which
are either set forth in the statute or are supplied by the default rules of general trust law.”).
65. See generally J UN PENG, S TATE AND L OCAL PENSION F UND MANAGEMENT
16–17 (2009).
66. The trustees may be teachers or firefighters or local government administrators. But
in most cases, they are not investment professionals. See Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & Amy B.
Monahan, Who’s Afraid of Good Governance? State Fiscal Crises, Public Pension Underfunding,
and the Resistance to Governance Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1317, 1326 (2014).
67. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-4-104 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess. and First
Ex. Sess.) (“The administration and control of the Arkansas Public Employees’ Retirement
System shall be vested in a board called the ‘Board of Trustees . . .’”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 744921(1), (2) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (stating that “[t]he fund is a trust fund” and
that “[t]he board shall have the responsibility for the management of the fund”).
68. For example, the New Mexico Constitution mandates that “[a]ll funds . . . paid
into . . . a public employees retirement system . . . shall be held . . . in a trust fund to be
administered and invested by each respective system for the sole and exclusive benefit of the
members, retirees and other beneficiaries of that system. Expenditures from a system trust fund
shall only be made for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries and for expenses of administering
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looked to the Restatement of Trusts to assess whether public pension
trustees acted in accordance with the “well-established rules of the
law of trusts.” 69
Although public employees are frequently required to directly
contribute portions of their salaries into the pension trusts (and
always do so indirectly by trading lower salaries for pension benefits),
state statutes effectively regard employees as the trust beneficiaries. 70

the system.” N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 22(A). The retirement board is “the trustee[ ] for [its]
respective system[ ] and ha[s] the sole and exclusive fiduciary duty and responsibility for
administration and investment of the trust fund held by [its] respective system.” Id. at § 22(B).
See also CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(b) (“The members of the retirement board . . . shall
discharge their duties with respect to the system solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive
purposes of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries, minimizing employer
contributions thereto, and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the system. A
retirement board’s duty to its participants and their beneficiaries shall take precedence over any
other duty.”); IDAHO CODE § 59-1301(2) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. and First Ex. Sess’s)
(“[T]he fiduciaries of the fund shall discharge their duties with respect to the fund solely in the
interest of the members and their beneficiaries . . . .”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4921(1) (LEXIS
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“The fund is a trust fund and shall be used solely for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to members and member beneficiaries and defraying reasonable
expenses of administering the fund.”); Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 66, at 1339
(reporting that in a sample of six state plans, the statutory provisions for each plan require plan
assets to be held in trust, and also require the plan trustees to act solely in the interest of
beneficiaries, and with the care, skill, and caution of a prudent person in light of the
circumstances at the time of the decision).
69. City of Sacramento v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1470, 1494–95 (Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that “[u]nder well-established rules of the law of trusts, a trustee’s
primary duty of loyalty is to the beneficiaries of the trust,” and thus, in interpreting relevant
definitions, pension fund trustees must subordinate consideration of employer costs to the
obligation to act solely in the interest of the beneficiaries); see also In re Barney, 710 A.2d 408,
410 (N.H. 1998) (stating that “[u]nder the common law of trusts, the [board] [of trustees of
the New Hampshire Retirement System] owe the [NHRS] members and beneficiaries a
fiduciary obligation to manage the [NHRS] for the benefit of its members and beneficiaries”);
White v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 268 P.3d 600, 601, 608 (Or. 2011) (relying on a trustee’s
common law obligation to both “protect capital and secure reasonable return” to hold that
pension fund trustees “do[] not necessarily breach [their] fiduciary duty” by “administer[ing]
the system to create and maintain long-term stability and viability in the system,” even if “in so
doing [they] fail[] to maximize the benefits that will be paid to [current plan beneficiaries]”);
Arken v. City of Portland, 263 P.3d 975, 1006 (Or. 2011) (finding that trustees do breach
their fiduciary duties through administrative decisions that favor some beneficiaries over
others, since the Restatement of Trusts “makes clear that a trustee has a duty of impartiality
and . . . must administer the trust ‘impartially and with due regard for the diverse beneficial
interests created by the terms of the trust’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §
79(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2003)).
70. “[E]mployee contribution rates typically are between four and eight percent of
pay.” NAT’L ASSN. OF STATE RETIREMENT ADMINS., NASRA ISSUE BRIEF: EMPLOYEE
CONTRIBUTIONS
TO
PUBLIC
PENSION
PLANS
1
(2015),
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Like beneficiaries of traditional donative trusts, the employees cannot
sell or transfer their interests in the pension trusts. 71 Unlike donative
trust beneficiaries, however, public plan beneficiaries are not directly
affected by the trustees’ investment management performance. The
promised pension benefits are generally fixed and subject to legal
restrictions on some forms of benefit reductions, although there is
significant variation and legal uncertainty as to the extent of
the protections. 72
III. PRIOR SCHOLARSHIP
While scholars have analyzed ERISA’s initial adoption of
donative trust principles, the pension landscape has changed
dramatically since 1974. Most importantly, the shortcomings of the
trust model as adopted in 1974 were limited by the very nature of
the then prominent but now largely extinct private-sector defined
benefit plans, which decoupled employee benefits from trustee
performance. Plan benefits were protected by funding requirements
and by a federal insurance scheme. Still, the transplanted trust
regime presented challenges in plan administration decisions and
decisions regarding the use of plan assets in corporate

http://www.nasra.org/content.asp?contentid=122. “[S]ince 2009, more than 35 states
(including Puerto Rico) have increased required employee contribution rates.” Id.
71. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4923 (West) (providing that the pension benefits
“shall not be subject to execution, garnishment or attachment . . . and shall be unassignable.”).
72. The promised pension benefits are generally treated as contractual obligations, and
some are further protected by constitutional amendments prohibiting the reduction of
benefits. See Amy Monahan, Understanding the Legal Limits on Public Pension Reform, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. 3 (2013), http://www.aei.org/files/2013/05/29/-understanding-thelegal-limits-on-public-pension-reform_104816268458.pdf (observing that “[s]ome states have
amended their constitutions to specifically provide that public pension benefits shall be
considered contractual in nature”). The extent of benefit protection remains subject to
significant uncertainty and legal challenges. For a summary of recent litigation challenging
benefit
reductions,
see
Pension
Litigation
Tracker,
http://pensionlitigation.org/category/all/topics/reduced-benefits/?submit=View (last visited Dec.
1, 2015). Furthermore, the scope of protection in municipal bankruptcy likewise remains
unclear. Scholars such as David Skeel have suggested that public plan participants have pension
benefit claims that are secured only to the extent of the assets set aside in the pension trusts;
for any benefit amounts not secured by assets, participants become unsecured creditors of the
municipality not entitled to priority in any reorganization. See David Skeel, Can Pensions be
Restructured in (Detroit’s) Municipal Bankruptcy? 11–12 (Oct. 1, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/508.
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reorganizations. 73 In such contexts, employer trustees with discretion
over the use of plan assets faced strong incentives to use such assets
to benefit the corporate shareholders rather than the pension
plan beneficiaries. 74
Scholars such as John Langbein and Daniel Fischel have argued
that “it was unwise for ERISA to attempt to capture the complex
responsibilities of plan fiduciaries by analogy to the simpler world of
the private gratuitous trusts” 75 when the latter benefits only the
donees while the former provides mutual economic advantage. 76
Settlors of donative trusts have no continuing interests in the trusts,
but employers retain strong economic interests in their retirement
plans, including the liability for defined benefit plan funding. 77
Accordingly, Langbein and Fischel have called for more forthright
recognition of the employers’ interests as beneficiaries in the pension
trusts, arguing that both employers and employees should be
considered trust beneficiaries and that courts should evaluate
whether particular trustee decisions are “consistent with the ex ante
understanding between the parties.” 78 Acknowledging that this kind
of legal analysis would not be simple, the authors have not offered
any guidance on how courts should determine whether a particular
action is consistent with the ex ante understanding among the
parties. The lack of concrete guidance for the task reflects the
inherent tension in the undertaking: while donative trust law has
always required trustees to be impartial with respect to the interests
of different beneficiaries, requiring a trustee to adjudicate between
the interests of the employer-beneficiaries and employee-beneficiaries
would frustrate the very concept of a fiduciary.
Similarly, although scholars have recognized that pension trusts
are “self-settled” insofar as they are “created in consideration of
services rendered by the employees, and that the employees are

73. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1138–43, 1155–57; see also Stein, supra
note 51 at 54–55.
74. Id.; see also Langbein, supra note 51, at 132.
75. Id. at 1157.
76. Id. at 1113–14, 1117–18; see also John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks
Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207 (Gerhard Casper et al. eds., 1991) (observing that “there are
important differences between the private trust and the pension trust, and ERISA is sometimes
insensitive to these differences”).
77. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1112–13.
78. Id. at 1158–59.
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therefore the settlors,” 79 the acknowledgment has been purely
theoretical. 80 After all, if the law recognized employees not just as
beneficiaries of the pension trust but also as its settlors, then, under
trust law principles, the employees would have to be afforded the
corresponding control rights, including control over the selection of
the trustees. But a trust in which the employers and employees were
both to be properly recognized as “settlor-beneficiaries” would be
unworkable. 81 The donative trust assumes the existence of clearly
defined settlor preferences and provides a mechanism for imposing
such preferences on a trustee, and ultimately on the beneficiaries.
The donative trust model does not provide a mechanism for the
coordination of the preferences of multiple settlors, particularly
where such settlors are also the trust beneficiaries.
The current regulatory framework for private and public plans
therefore continues to rely on the fiction that treats employers as the
trust settlors and trustees, and employees as the trust beneficiaries.
Pursuant to this fiction, the current system relies on traditional
donative trust fiduciary obligations to protect locked-in employees,
all while saddling them with the investment risk. 82 Indeed, the
regulatory landscape for defined contribution plans now resembles
that of welfare benefit plans prior to the passage of the Affordable
79. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 156.3 (4th ed. 1987).
80. See e.g., Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy
of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 517 (2015) (noting that a
rule in which the fiduciary had to consider and balance the competing interests of employers
and employees “would be difficult to fashion and difficult for both fiduciaries and courts
to apply”).
81. Business trusts, however, have recognized a version of “settlor-beneficiaries” in the
form of “investors,” who voluntarily acquire their interests in the trusts and who may also exit
from trust arrangements if they are displeased with the trustee. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit.12, § 3805 (West 2016) (“A beneficial owner’s beneficial interest in the statutory trust is
freely transferable except to the extent otherwise provided in the governing instrument of the
statutory trust.”). Recent analysis of mutual funds—most of which are organized as business
trusts—has shown that when investors can exit easily from the trusts, the exit strategy
eliminates the investors’ incentives to enforce fiduciary obligations. John Morley & Quinn
Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual
Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 102 (2010).
82. In contrast, under the default provisions of the statutory business trust statutes,
beneficiary interests in statutory business trusts are generally freely transferable and holders of
beneficial interests generally have certain control rights, including the right to direct the
trustees with respect to certain events. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 12, §§ 3805–06 (West
2016) (stating that a “beneficial interest in the statutory trust is freely transferable” and giving
persons the right “to direct the trustees . . . in the management of the statutory trust”).
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Care Act. In the absence of substantive regulation and in the
presence of employer incentives to minimize healthcare expenses, the
discretion and deference afforded by ERISA’s trust-based framework
to conflicted employer fiduciaries became, perversely, “a shield
against liability.” 83
Recent scholarship on retirement savings identifies the numerous
shortcomings of the current private and public pension
arrangements, including the poor performance of employer
fiduciaries, 84 but rarely directly questions the persistence of the
donative trust paradigm across private and public plans. 85 A number
of authors continue to advocate for greater reliance on the fiduciary
standard. 86 However, in what might be considered an implicit

83. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of
ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391 (2000) (examining the “perverse
operation of ERISA’s fiduciary regime” in the “administration of modern health care and
pension benefit plans”); see also Langbein, supra note 76, at 216; Brendan S. Maher & Peter K.
Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 472–73 (2010); Beverly Cohen,
Divided Loyalties: How the Metlife v. Glenn Standard Discounts ERISA Fiduciaries’ Conflicts of
Interest, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 955, 974 (2009).
84. On private-sector pension plans, see generally Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose
Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices,
11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361 (2002) and Zelinsky, supra note 52. On public-sector
plans, see generally David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets:
Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 187 (2005) and Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 3 (2013).
85. But see Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary Obligation in
Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2013) (criticizing the employer-centric trust
model used in 401(k) plan regulation and advocating for the shifting for fiduciary
responsibility onto financial service providers); Michael J. Collins, It’s Common, But Is It
Right? The Common Law of Trusts in ERISA Fiduciary Litigation, 16 LAB. LAW. 391 (2001)
(analyzing and criticizing the following specific “situations in which courts have utilized the
common law of trusts in developing a federal common law of ERISA: (i) a fiduciary duty to
disclose early retirement windows that are under ‘serious consideration’ by management; (ii) a
right to contribution from a breaching co-fiduciary; (iii) nonfiduciary liability; and (iv) a
requirement that an employee stock ownership plan diversify its investments beyond
employer stock”).
86. See, e.g., Emily Adams, Protecting America’s Financial Future: Why Courts Should
Enforce ERISA’s Duties of Prudence and Disclosure, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 345, 358
(2011) (arguing for stricter court enforcement and “enhanced” fiduciary obligations); Anne
Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51
HOUS. L. REV. 153, 215 (2013) (proposing “strengthening fiduciary duties for structural plan
decisions”); Dana M. Muir, Reflections on ERISA’s Fiduciary Provisions: An Integral and
Integrated Part of the Statute, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 539, 552 (2013) (arguing that “ERISA’s
success in significant measure rests on its fiduciary provisions, which are integral to keeping
fiduciaries focused on the basics: loyalty and prudence”).
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acknowledgement of the model’s failure, recent academic proposals
put forth a variety of regulations to restrict the authority of
employers and mandate certain investment options for
employee participants. 87
This Article considers a more fundamental shift. The next
Section sets the foundation for the proposed reforms by showing
why the donative trust framework has proven inadequate for both
private-sector defined contribution plans and public-sector defined
benefit plans.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF TRUST-BASED GOVERNANCE
The current regulatory regime for retirement savings centers on
the employee-employer relationship. The central role of the
employer in individual retirement savings, however, is a historical
artifact that reflects an era in which employers used pension and
healthcare benefits to avoid wage caps, to encourage bonding to the
firm during the employee’s most productive years, and to facilitate
timely employee departure after a certain age. 88 Early pension
arrangements often did not require employees to directly contribute
anything to the pension fund and employers bore the entire
investment responsibility and risk. Although the pension benefits
were still a form of employee compensation, given the greater
employer control and the lack of direct employee contributions or
involvement, such arrangements had something of a gift-like quality,
which facilitated ERISA’s (and public plan) reliance on donative
trust fiduciary principles to regulate pension plans. The legacy of the
gift analogy is discussed below.

87. See, e.g., James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees, 15 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 511 (2013); Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The
Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J.
1476, 1501 (2015).
88. Douglas A. Wolf & Frank Levy, Pension Coverage, Pension Vesting, and the
Distribution of Job Tenures, in RETIREMENT AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 23, 27 (Brookings
Institution) (Henry J. Aaron & Gary Burtless eds., 1984) (“[An] employee’s productivity
begins to decline at some point in his career, but because of the customs of the internal labor
market, a firm cannot reduce a long-term employee’s wages. For this reason, a firm has an
interest in encouraging employees to retire at certain ages. The retirement income provided by
a pension facilitates such induced retirement.”).
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A. Private-Sector Plans
This Section considers the shortcomings of the private-sector
401(k) plans that stem from the reliance on the donative trust
framework as a primary regulatory tool. 89 Today, employees are at
the mercy of employer “settlors” to establish a plan in the first place,
leaving more than forty percent of private-sector employees without
access to an employer-sponsored retirement plan. 90 Those with access
to an employer plan and who choose to make salary deferrals to save
for retirement remain subject to employer control over plan design
and administration. In the absence of market checks, to protect
locked-in employees, the current framework imposes fiduciary
obligations on employers that administer such plans. Such
obligations are not consistent with the employers’ economic interests
and are not readily enforceable by the employees or relevant
regulatory agencies. Empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that
as a result of having the employers as mandatory investment
intermediaries, employees are frequently subjected to poorly
constructed investment menus and non-transparent fee structures.
1. Employers as both settlors and fiduciaries
According to the Department of Labor, the decision to offer a
retirement plan can be “one of the most challenging, yet rewarding”
decisions that an employer can make. 91 No employer is required to
establish a retirement plan. Many do not. The ability of employers to
simply cease offering retirement plans at any time animates the
current regulatory framework. 92

89. Although ERISA does impose a disclosure and reporting regime on 401(k) plans,
as well as certain non-discrimination, anti-alienation and vesting rules, the administration of
401(k) plans is regulated primarily by the imposition of trust-based fiduciary obligations on
those who administer such plans. The application of such obligations in practice has generated
much confusion. See, e.g., Advisory Council on Emp. Welfare & Pension Benefit Plans,
Outsourcing
Employee
Benefit
Plan
Services,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/2014ACreport3.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2016).
90. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES –
MARCH 2014 (2014).
91. Meeting
Your
Fiduciary
Responsibilities,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/fiduciaryresponsibility.html
(last
visited
Apr. 23, 2016).
92. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income—the Ideal, the
Possible, and the Reality, 11 ELDER L.J. 37, 44 (2003) (observing that because private pensions
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The decision to offer a retirement plan is itself purely a business
or “settlor” decision that is not governed by ERISA’s fiduciary
standards. Similarly, decisions to determine the benefit package, to
include certain features in a plan, to amend a plan, and to terminate
a plan—in effect, the infinite number of choices that shape a plan’s
design—are also business decisions in which an employer may act on
behalf of the business and presumably in the best interest of
the shareholders. 93
Once the plan is established, however, the employer, like a
trustee in a donative trust, must take on fiduciary responsibilities
with respect to the plan. With the exception of the so-called
“business” decisions enumerated above, employers who have
discretion over the plan or plan assets must exercise their discretion
solely in the interest of plan participants and for the exclusive purpose
of providing benefits and defraying reasonable expenses. They must
carry out their duties prudently and in accordance with the
plan documents. 94
In practice, the fiduciary duty of 401(k) plan sponsors (i.e., the
employers) extends primarily to (1) the day-to-day administration of
the plan, including the establishment of a trust to hold plan assets, a
recordkeeping system to track the flow of monies going to and from
the retirement plan, and a reporting system to provide adequate
disclosure to participants and to the government; and (2) the
selection and monitoring of an investment menu from which
individual participants select their investments. 95 In each case,
although a plan sponsor may hire third-party service providers with
relevant expertise to assist with the enumerated tasks, the selection

are voluntary arrangements, “[t]he greater the pressure put on employers to provide more
widespread benefits, the less likely it is they will maintain pension plans at all”).
93. See, e.g., Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (“Plan sponsors who
alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries . . . . When employers
undertake those actions, they do not act as fiduciaries . . . but are analogous to the settlors
of a trust.”).
94. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a) (2012).
95. ERISA Section 404(c) allows employers to delegate individual investment decisions
to employees. The employer is then relieved of fiduciary responsibility for the employees’
selections if the investment menu provides the employees with a range of diversified investment
options, with enough information about the alternatives to enable employees to make
informed investment decisions, and with the right to change their investment selections with
reasonable frequency. 26 I.R.C. § 404(c) (2012); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(c) (2012).
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and oversight of such providers is itself a fiduciary task that remains
with the employer. 96
Employer decisions regarding the investment menu and the
selection of third-party service providers have a significant impact on
the long-term savings of individual plan participants. The impact
comes primarily in the form of plan costs and the extent to which an
employer is prudent in ensuring that the costs charged to the
employees are reasonable relative to the services provided. Fees and
expenses paid by employees substantially reduce the growth in
employee retirement accounts. As the Department of Labor has
warned, over thirty-five years, a “1 percent difference in fees and
expenses [reduces an] account balance at retirement by
28 percent.” 97

96. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Revenue Sharing in 401(k) Plans: Employers as Monitors?,
20 CONN. INS. L.J. 485, 504 (2014) (“ERISA’s exclusion of mutual funds from fiduciary
status and de facto exclusion of nearly any service provider that wants to be excluded leaves
employers holding the fiduciary bag for 401(k) plans.”). In recent years, multiple employer
plans (MEPs), including so-called “open MEPs,” have gained some traction among small and
mid-sized employers. MEPs generally purport to take on plan administration for participating
employers, thus reducing employers’ fiduciary liability. See, e.g., Dan Toomey, Is a Multiple
Employer Plan the Right Retirement Option for Your Business?, TRINET (May 2012),
http://www.trinet.com/newsletter/05_12/multiple_employer_plan.htm.
Although
the
Department of Labor has expressed concern over such arrangements particularly with respect
to the “open” MEPs that bring together unrelated employers, there appears to be growing
momentum to resolve the current limitations of the open MEP arrangements. See Hazel
Bradford, Multiple employer plans grabbing more attention, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Mar.
17, 2014) (noting that Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Secretary of Labor of the Employee Benefits
Security Administration, has suggested that promoters of open MEPs are “falsely claiming the
employers will have no ERISA reporting or fiduciary obligations if they sign up for an open
MEP”); Sean Forbes, Support for Open MEPs Builds at Senate Panel Hearing, PENSION &
BENEFITS DAILY (Oct. 28, 2015). In 2015, the Department of Labor even expressed its
support for the creation of state-sponsored multiple employer plans. See Employee Benefits
Security Administration, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs that Sponsor
or Facilitate Plans Covered by ERISA, 80 Fed. Reg. 71936 (2015),
http://webapps.dol.gov/federalregister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=28540. At the same time,
certain service providers have begun to encourage plan sponsors to name an external
investment manager directly in the plan documents in order to transform such act from a
fiduciary one to a “non-fiduciary settlor act.” See, e.g., Heath Miller & Al Otto, Conflicts Bring
Liability to Retirement Plan Fiduciaries: The Ethics of Serving Two Masters, AM. CONF. INST.
(May
2014),
http://www.americanconference.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/2014-ICLE-Article.pdf. The merits of this legal theory have not
been tested and the strategy, while likely to foster the entrenchment of particular service
providers, would not absolve plan sponsors from ongoing monitoring obligations.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
97. A
Look
At
401(k)
Plan
Fees,
U.S.
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/401k_employee.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2016).
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What sorts of costs must the employer negotiate and monitor for
its employees? The largest component of 401(k) plan fees and
expenses is associated with managing plan investments. Fees for
investment management and other investment-related services are
generally assessed as a percentage of assets invested by particular
employees and are ultimately deducted from the investment returns.
A particular investment fund may, for example, charge individual
participants 75 basis points as an investment management fee. In
addition, there are the administrative costs of setting up and
operating the plans, including the provision of recordkeeping,
accounting, legal, and trustee services.
At present, there are a myriad of fees and fee arrangements that
service providers and employers use to cover the various costs of
providing a 401(k) plan to employees. 98 For example:
• The employer may choose to cover some or all of the
administrative expenses of the retirement plan using its
corporate assets. Such a decision is not a fiduciary decision
and the expenses covered by the employer are not subject to
any kind of “reasonableness” test under ERISA; or
• The employer may pass both the administrative and the
investment costs onto the plan. In this case, the administrative
costs may be shared equally by all participants or allocated in
proportion to the value of assets in individual accounts; or
• The employer may negotiate a revenue sharing arrangement
whereby service providers offer to apply some of the revenue
from certain investment management fees toward the costs of
plan administration; in such cases, either the employer’s “out
of pocket” bill may decrease, or a smaller administrative
expense may be charged to the plan. Importantly, because
only certain investment options (for example, certain actively
managed funds) may offer the revenue sharing feature, the
fees collected from individuals who select such investment
98. Plan sponsors currently have to navigate the revenue sharing fees, sub-TA fees,
shareholder servicing fees, 12b1 fees, finder’s fees, wrap fees, mortality fees, and market
adjustment fees. See Matthew D. Hutcheson, Uncovering and Understanding Hidden Fees in
Qualified Retirement Plans, 15 ELDER L.J. 323, 339 (2007); see also Deloitte Consulting LLP,
Inside the Structure of Defined Contribution/401(k) Plan Fees, 2013: A study assessing the
mechanics of the ‘all-in’ fee 6 (Aug. 2014) (noting that “[t]here are a variety of fee
arrangements to pay for the wide array of services used by defined contribution plans,” all of
which can be combined together in a variety of different ways based on the needs of the
plan sponsor).
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options may subsidize the administrative expenses for the plan
as a whole. 99
In each case, the employer meanders between settlor and trustee
roles, 100 all while serving as a critical intermediary between individual
employees and the capital markets. The next sections present the
empirical evidence of poor employer performance in this
intermediary capacity, as well as the reasons why such empirical
findings should not be surprising.
2. Assessing fiduciary performance
The decisions of private-sector employers with respect to plan
administration, though subject to the fiduciary standard, have
frequently left employees with investment options and fee
arrangements that are suboptimal relative to what is available in the
marketplace. 101 Despite extensive empirical evidence documenting
the desirability of low-cost index funds, employer-constructed
401(k) menus have continued to add relatively expensive actively
managed funds, 102 including those whose above-average expenses
could not be justified by the added diversification. 103 According to a
recent study, in the average 401(k) plan, “an investor making
optimal menu allocations [has been] forced to pay forty-three basis
99. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1961, 1983 (2010). As Fisch recounts, the issue is whether companies managing the
plans are receiving payments in return for including certain fund companies in their plans.
Such payments might encourage employers to include inferior funds in their investment menus
and to reject strong performers that do not participate in revenue sharing. Id.
100. See infra Section IV.A.3.
101. Ayres & Curtis, supra note 87, at 1501 (concluding that the study’s empirical
findings show that “high fees are a significant issue for participants in 401(k) plans”). For an
overview of the nearly forty cases related to 401(k) fees that had been commenced as of
September 2015, see 401(k) Fee Cases, Chartered, GROOM L. GROUP, (Sep. 30, 2015),
http://www.groom.com/media/publication/1636_401k_Fee_Cases%20_Detailed_Chart_Se
ptember%20_2015.pdf.
102. See Kwak, supra note 87, at 511; see also Jeffrey R. Brown, Nellie Liang, & Scott
Weisbenner, Individual Account Investment Options and Portfolio Choice: Behavioral Lessons
from 401(k) Plans, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1992, 1992-2013 (2007) (finding that “the vast majority
of the new funds added to 401(k) plans are high-cost actively managed equity funds, as
opposed to lower-cost equity index funds.”).
103. Ayres & Curtis, supra note 87, at 1504–07 (discussing the problem of so-called
“dominated funds,” which the authors describe as “funds that are so clearly inferior to other
funds or groups of funds offered in the same plan menu that investors are clearly better off
avoiding them” and finding that in a sample of 3,534 plans, 52% had at least one dominated
fund on the menu).
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points in expenses over [a low-cost] benchmark,” with “19% of plans
hav[ing] menu additional fund fees of more than seventy-five basis
points.” 104 In some cases, the additional fees from poorly constructed
plan menus have eliminated the preferential tax treatment afforded
to 401(k) plans. 105 Although poorly constructed menus have been
found across all types of employers, losses from additional fees have
been particularly high for employees in smaller plans, which have had
both higher costs and lower quality menus. 106
The high fees in 401(k) plans reflect two underlying weaknesses
of employer-fiduciaries. First, despite their obligation to act
prudently—that is “with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims” 107—employer
fiduciaries have demonstrated profound gaps in their understanding
of retirement plan arrangements. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has documented employers’ struggle to understand
the fees that they and their participants are charged, as well as their
tendency to underestimate the fees to which their employees are
subject. 108 For example, approximately half of the employers surveyed
by the GAO in 2011 “did not know if they or their participants paid
investment management fees” or whether their plans incurred
transaction costs, while a third did not know whether or not the plan
paid for trustee, legal, or audit services. 109 Scholars have observed
that it has been seemingly “impossible to require employers to take
more of an interest in their employees’ retirement savings options”110

104. Id. at 1501.
105. Id.
106. Id. (finding that “the problem of fees is especially acute in small plans”); see also
Deloitte Consulting LLP, supra note 98, at 4 (finding plan size to be a significant fee driver).
107. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012).
108. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-325, 401(K) PLANS:
INCREASED EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH AND BROADER OVERSIGHT MAY HELP REDUCE PLAN
FEES (2012) (citing various consultants’ observations regarding common employer
misunderstanding and finding, for example, “that at least 45 of the 91 plan sponsors
[surveyed] had revenue sharing arrangements, despite reporting not having or not knowing of
such arrangements”).
109. Id. Lack of relevant knowledge was more prevalent among small employers (those
with fewer than 50 employees). Id. at 17–18.
110. Kwak, supra note 87, at 511; see also Brown et al., supra note 102.
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and that “few employers regularly audit their plans to lower costs.”111
Phyllis Borzi, the Assistant Secretary of Labor of the Employee
Benefits Security Administration, observed that as of 2013, many
plan sponsors did not understand the pricing structure for bundled
services and mistakenly thought that “services like recordkeeping
were being provided free of charge.” 112 The Department of Labor
has since promulgated fee-disclosure regulations to help both plan
fiduciaries and plan participants make better-informed decisions.113
Though the effectiveness of these disclosure requirements remains to
be determined, the need for such an intervention underscores the
limitations of fiduciary-based governance in the current
pension landscape. 114
The regulatory efforts also reflect the challenges facing employer
fiduciaries in navigating relationships with—and payments to—thirdparty service providers, some of whom provide both plan-related and
non-plan-related corporate services to the plan sponsors. 115 As recent
litigation has revealed, such service providers may discount non-plan

111. John Wasik, Why 401(k)s Have Failed, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2013/04/24/why-401ks-havefailed/#199dc50d4a7e.
112. Christopher Carosa, Exclusive Interview with Phyllis C. Borzi: Why Plan Sponsors
Shouldn’t Treat Their 401k Plans Like Cheap T-Shirts, FIDUCIARYNEWS.COM (Sept. 24, 2013,
12:03 AM), http://www.fiduciarynews.com/2013/09/exclusive-interview-with-phyllis-cborzi-why-plan-sponsors-shouldnt-treat-their-401k-plans-like-cheap-t-shirts/.
113. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(c)(iv) (establishing specific disclosures that plan
service providers must provide to plan fiduciaries to help ensure that the fiduciaries are
provided the information they need to assess both the reasonableness of the compensation to
be paid for plan services and potential conflicts of interest that may affect the performance of
those services); Fiduciary Requirements for Disclosure in Participant-Directed Individual
Account Plans, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a–5(c)–(d) (requiring plan administrators to provide
participants with certain “plan-related” and “investment-related” information).
114. The regulations—and employer fiduciaries—face an uphill battle since “service
providers are going to considerable lengths to make the mandated fee disclosures difficult for
employers to comprehend and analyze.” See Dana M. Muir, Revenue Sharing in 401(k) Plans:
Employers as Monitors?, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 485, 509 (2014).
115. See, e.g., Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 337–41 (8th Cir. 2014) cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 477 (2014) (finding an ERISA violation in the plan sponsor’s failure to evaluate the
reasonableness of fees charged by its recordkeeper); Kruger v. Novant Health, Inc., No.
1:14CV208, 2015 WL 5511052 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2015) (denying a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ claims that the plan sponsor violated its fiduciary obligations by failing to monitor
the compensation, including the increase in fees, paid to the plan recordkeeper); Complaint,
Troudt v. Oracle Corp., D. Colo., No. 1:16-cv-00175 (Jan. 22, 2016) (alleging that Oracle
breached its ERISA fiduciary duties by paying excessive fees for record-keeping and
administrative services and resulting in more than $40 million of losses to the plan).
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services provided to plan sponsors while charging above-market rates
for the plan services. 116 Alternatively, investment fund providers have
commonly offered to “share” or channel a portion of the investment
management fees from certain funds toward the cost of various
administrative services provided for 401(k) plans, thereby lowering
employers’ out-of-pocket costs. 117 Recent scholarship has also shown
that employers have not successfully resisted the tendency of mutual
fund companies serving as plan trustees to include their own
affiliated funds in the investment menus, even when such funds have
performed poorly. 118
3. The shortcomings of ERISA’s fiduciary standard
ERISA’s fiduciary standard, though arguably an afterthought in
the original 1974 legislation, has become the centerpiece of 401(k)
plan governance. Yet while ERISA’s drafters understood that a
fiduciary standard borrowed from trust law and superimposed on
private employers could not substitute for substantive pension
regulation, current pension regulation aims to protect U.S.
employees primarily by subjecting those who administer private
pension plans to trust law’s care and loyalty obligations.
This Section shows that while the fiduciary regime may be an
efficient governance mechanism for a traditional donative trust, it is
ill suited for the non-donative, dual-settlor, dual-beneficiary
arrangement that is the modern 401(k) plan. The trust-based
fiduciary standard for plan administration is generally inconsistent
with employers’ economic interests and “settlor” rights and, in the
absence of rules-based guidance, creates costly uncertainty for plan
sponsors. Furthermore, because both employee rights and judicial
review of plan administration draw on trust-law principles,
employees have limited access to either judicial or market remedies
for plan mismanagement.
a. Employer conflict, confusion, and costs. First and foremost, the
current fiduciary regime perpetuates ERISA’s long-standing fiction
116. Tussey, 746 F.3d 327 (finding that the employer defendants knew that removing a
particular Wellington Fund and mapping its assets to the Fidelity Freedom Funds would
ultimately benefit ABB).
117. See Muir, supra note 114, at 487–95 (2014).
118. Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm, & Irina Stefanescu, It Pays to Set the Menu:
Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans, J. FIN. 1 (Dec. 2015).
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about the employer’s ability to successfully wear and switch between
two “hats”—one for its role as settlor, which permits the employer
to consider its own interests in establishing and designing a plan, and
another for its role as plan fiduciary, which requires the employer to
act solely in the interest of plan participants in the course of plan
administration. 119 The second hat requires employers—who are
otherwise conditioned to further the interests of shareholders—to act
solely in the interest of employees when dealing with what is, in
effect, a form of employee compensation. But employers do not
conceive of themselves as fiduciaries of the employees when
negotiating and managing other forms of employee compensation,
and indeed are typically in a kind of adversarial position with respect
to the employees. 120
Although ERISA does not require employers to wear the
fiduciary hat when determining the generosity of the plan terms, the
problem is that the line between settlor and fiduciary decisions has
never been, and indeed, can never be, clear. 121 Many administrative
“settlor” decisions, in practice, have the same effect as “fiduciary”
implementation decisions. For example, employers can freely choose
to offer less generous contributions or not to pay for certain
administrative costs of the plan (settlor decisions), yet they may not
take employer costs into consideration when selecting service
providers or investment options (fiduciary decisions). It is not
surprising that a sample of recent settlements reflects employers’
unwillingness to heed this artificial distinction. 122
119. At its inception, the drafters of ERISA were cognizant of the fact that employers
liable for the funding of defined benefit plans would demand control over such plans.
Accordingly, ERISA permitted employers to have their own officers, employees, or agents
serve as trustees and manage the administration of the plan and the investment of plan assets.
See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1126–27. The courts subsequently held that
nonneutral trustees must make their decisions “with an eye single to the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries,” but would not be found at fault if particular decisions
“incidentally” benefitted the corporation. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271
(2d Cir. 1982).
120. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 60, at 43 (noting that in negotiating the terms of
employee benefits such as pensions, “the employer is presumptively the
employee’s adversary”).
121. For a discussion of the limitations of the Supreme Court’s settlor/fiduciary
doctrine, see Muir & Stein, supra note 80, at 514–36.
122. Robert Steyer, Recent Fiduciary Breach Settlements, PENSIONS & INVS. (Feb. 23,
2015), http://www.pionline.com/article/20150223/PRINT/302239972/recent-fiduciarybreach-settlements (describing various “revenue sharing” arrangements in which fees for
certain investments were used to offset employer costs); see also Amy B. Monahan, Employers as

662

05.SHNITSER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

629

8/4/2016 6:38 PM

Trusts No More

Among the employers who recognize the obligation to wear the
fiduciary hat in administering the plan, many struggle to understand
precisely what the fiduciary hat requires. Fiduciary obligations do
not set clear rules and requirements for plan administration or
investment menu selection, but instead operate on the basis of
vigorously litigated loyalty and prudence standards. Current
litigation reveals a striking lack of consensus about what the fiduciary
standard requires of plan fiduciaries. 123
Consequently, retirement experts observe that “plan sponsors
just aren’t aware of the nature of their responsibilities as plan
sponsors” and many “don’t recognize the true nature of their
personal fiduciary liability.” 124 Even scholars and practitioners who
embrace the current fiduciary framework seek to simplify the
fiduciary standard by replacing it with a list of permissible
investments that limit the employer’s fiduciary discretion. 125 At the
same time, a whole industry has emerged to find ways of helping
employers skirt the fiduciary label and limit participants’ ability to
bring suit, thereby frustrating the very purpose of the
federal legislation. 126

Risks, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 773 (2014) (“An employer may select a 401(k) plan
administrator, and 401(k) plan investment options based on which company will provide them
with the lowest out-of-pocket costs, not which will deliver the most retirement security
to participants.”).
123. See, e.g., Jacklyn Wille, Justices Wrangle With Monitoring Duties of 401(k)
Fiduciaries During Oral Arguments, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://news.bna.com/pdln/display/batch_print_display.adp?searchid=26395545 (noting the
lack of consensus among Supreme Court justices in determining what 401(k) fiduciaries
monitoring plan investments must do to satisfy their fiduciary obligations); see also Advisory
Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, supra note 89 (calling on the
Department of Labor to clarify fiduciary obligations in outsourcing administrative tasks).
124. Carosa, supra note 112.
125. Kwak, for example, suggests that the Section 404(c) fiduciary safe harbor should be
limited to plans that only include low-cost index funds. Kwak, supra note 87, at 530.
126. See, e.g., John J. Cannon III & Kenneth J. Laverriere, Just Say No: Why Directors
Should Avoid Duties That Will Subject Them to ERISA, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY (Feb. 25,
2015),
http://news.bna.com/pdln/display/batch_print_display.adp?searchid=26395549
(noting that “ERISA imposes standards of conduct on fiduciaries that are more restrictive than
those imposed on directors generally, and complying with these standards can lead to potential
conflicts with a director’s overall responsibility to the corporation and its shareholders.”);
Heath Miller & Al Otto, Conflicts Bring Liability to Retirement Plan Fiduciaries: The Ethics of
CONF.
INST.
(May
2014),
Serving
Two
Masters,
AM.
http://www.americanconference.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/2014-ICLEArticle.pdf (discussing the strategy of designating investment managers directly in the plan
document as a means of limiting the liability of the plan sponsor); Defined Contribution
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The search for ways to escape the fiduciary label reflects the fact
that fiduciary decision-making is not costless for employers, who, by
deciding to offer a 401(k) plan, accept the risk of fiduciary liability
for any actions taken in a fiduciary capacity. The time and effort
necessary to understand the 401(k) landscape; to find, evaluate, and
monitor service providers; and to construct investment menus that
will pass fiduciary muster is not trivial for the many employers who
are not in the business of investment management and whose staffs
have no special skills or preparation for the task. 127
The benefits of employee retention and satisfaction, however, are
more likely to correlate with the generosity of the “settlor” (nonfiduciary) decisions like employer matches, than with the degree of
menu or fee optimization. 128 The latter is relatively difficult to assess
and of varying consequence to different employees. To the extent
that an employer offers in its 401(k) menu both “good” and “bad”
Outsourcing with Russell, RUSSELL INVESTMENTS, http://www.russell.com/us/institutionalinvestors/solutions/defined-contribution-outsourcing.page (last visited Apr. 23, 2016); see
also Christopher Carosa, Exclusive Interview: ERISA Attorney Stephen Rosenberg Says
Litigation’s Legacy is Improved Plan Design, FIDUCIARYNEWS.COM (Oct. 20, 2015),
http://www.fiduciarynews.com/2015/10/exclusive-interview-erisa-attorney-stephenrosenberg-says-litigations-legacy-is-improved-plan-design/ (observing that, in response to the
recent uptick in 401k litigation, plan sponsors have sought to design and draft retirement plans
in ways that “limit, either substantively or tactically, the ability of participants or beneficiaries
to successfully bring suit . . . .”).
127. See Nevin Adams, Biggest Small Plan Barrier? Burdensome Administration, ASPPA
NET
(Feb.
6,
2015),
http://www.asppa.org/News/BrowseTopics/Details/ArticleID/4232/Biggest-Small-Plan-Barrier-Burdensome-Administration
(reporting that burdensome plan administration was the largest obstacle to smaller employers
offering a workplace retirement plan); Comment Letter from Norman Stein, Senior Policy
Advisor, Pension Rights Center (Jan 19. 2016), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB7100065.pdf (observing that “many small employers lack expertise to identify plan providers
whose products comply with ERISA prudence without engaging expensive independent
advisors, and many such employers may thus have concerns about potential liability when they
act without such expertise.”).
128. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, An Affordable Care Act for Retirement Plans? 20
CONN. INS. L.J. 459, 465 (2014) (noting that “most employees, when deciding whether or
not to accept or retain an offer of employment from a firm, probably do not examine plan
details such as plan defaults, the quality of plan investments, investment fees, or forms of
distribution”). Furthermore, the adequacy of employees’ retirement plan savings is seldom of
concern to employers. See Majority of U.S. Companies Do Not Measure Effectiveness of
Retirement Plans for Employees, Wells Fargo Survey Reveals, WELLS FARGO (Apr. 19, 2012),
https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/press/2012/20120419_MajorityofUSCompanies/
(finding that as of 2011, only 11% of plan sponsors were “measuring each employee’s
retirement income and comparing it to expected needs; the majority (51%) [did] not provide
employees with estimates of annual retirement income they [could] expect based on
plan balances”).
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options, the employees who select the “good” options are no worse
off for having certain “bad” options in the menu (indeed, they may
actually be better off if the revenue sharing fees from the “bad”
options are used to cover the administrative expenses of the plan as a
whole). Thus, despite the obligations imposed by ERISA’s
“fiduciary” hat, employers face significant hurdles in meeting those
obligations. Enforcement of such employer obligations is limited by
the features of the trust-based judicial review discussed below.
b. Trust-based judicial review. The 2015 Supreme Court opinion
in Tibble v. Edison follows a long line of cases that invoke the
donative trust analogy in determining the scope of ERISA fiduciary
obligations and the appropriate standard of judicial review. 129 In
applying the analogy, however, the courts have wrestled with the
reality that employers who believe that the costs of 401(k) plans
outweigh their benefits may terminate existing plans or refuse to
form new ones. 130 In other words, the limits of fiduciary obligation in
the context of retirement plans have been set, at least in part, by
employer threats to stop offering plans to their employees. 131 The fear
of discouraging plan formation has resulted in the application of the
trust analogy that places a great premium on the employers’ role as
trust settlors, while ignoring the employees’ settlor role and the
employers’ beneficiary interests. Employers, like donative trust
settlors, have been afforded great deference in setting the scope of
“trustee” authority to administer the trust and interpret its terms. 132
129. Tibble v. Edison Int’l., 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015) (stating that the court has
“often noted that an ERISA fiduciary’s duty is derived from the common law of trusts”).
130. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 52, at 524 (observing that “‘employers’ decisions to
maintain and establish defined contribution plans are voluntary; if the costs of such plans
outweigh the perceived benefits, employers will abandon such plans or will not establish them
in the first place”).
131. The courts’ decisions have been made partly to “help[] keep administrative and
litigation expenses under control” so that such expenses do not “discourage employers from
offering [ERISA] plans in the first place.” Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061, 1078 (9th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648 (2010)); see also Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (noting that “courts may have to take account of
competing congressional purposes, such as Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced
protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a
system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage
employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place”).
132. In the seminal case Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court held
that “principles of the law of trusts . . . establish that a denial of benefits . . . must be reviewed
under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan expressly gives the plan administrator or
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Consequently, courts have deferred to employer fiduciaries (by
analogy to impartial donative trust trustees) on the interpretation of
contested plan terms, even where employers have had a clear
financial interest in such interpretations and even where the
participants have claimed that plan fiduciaries breached their duties
of prudence or loyalty. 133
At the same time, the delegation of investment selection to
individual participants has challenged the courts to determine the
scope and nature of the plan sponsor’s remaining fiduciary liability.
In the wake of class-action lawsuits against several large employers,
the courts have sought to determine the plan sponsors’ fiduciary
obligations with respect to the selection and oversight of investment
and administrative service providers.
The judicial focus to date has been on process and disclosure.
Provided that adequate disclosure has been made and the employer’s
process for selecting funds was not unreasonable, 134 courts have

fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the plan’s
terms, in which cases a deferential standard of review is appropriate.” 489 U.S. 101, 102
(1989) (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, subsequent plans’ sponsors have ensured the
availability of the deferential standard of review by drafting the plan documents to grant the
required discretion to the plan administrators. Importantly, however, the deferential review in
trust law is premised on decision making by disinterested fiduciaries. ERISA, however, explicitly
authorizes nonneutral fiduciaries with dual loyalties. Plan sponsors routinely have their own
employees and management personnel serving in fiduciary capacities for the retirement plans.
See Langbein, supra note 76, at 213. The only limit the Firestone Court imposed on deferential
review was that a reviewing court must consider a fiduciary’s actual conflict of interest as a
factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008) (holding that “circumstances” should be taken into account in
evaluating the presence of the conflict but refusing to provide further guidance on the
conflicts of interest).
133. For a survey of the conflicts of interest and the relevant case law, see Maher & Stris,
supra note 83, at 471–73; Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit
Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1146–52 (2001). See also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823
(2014) (No. 13-550) (“Post-Firestone, there is some confusion in the circuits on the question
whether deferential review applies to a claim of breach of the duties of loyalty or prudence,
where the claim turns on plan interpretation and the plan grants the administrator
discretionary authority.”).
134. Only in extreme cases have disclosure and process been held to be inadequate. In
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., for example, the complaint attacked the plan’s mutual funds
on multiple substantive grounds (alleging that they charged unnecessarily high fees,
underperformed available alternatives, offered expensive retail shares instead of cheaper
institutional shares, and charged marketing fees that did not benefit participants). 588 F.3d
585, 600 (8th Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit’s reversal was based on the disclosure issue. The
plaintiffs alleged that mutual funds were included in their plans because such funds made

666

05.SHNITSER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

629

8/4/2016 6:38 PM

Trusts No More

permitted investment menus to include “expensive” investment
options alongside diversified offerings of less expensive alternatives. 135
In Hecker v. Deere & Co., for example, the Seventh Circuit rejected
an excessive fee claim because the plan in question offered more
than twenty mutual funds, including some with low fees, and also
allowed participants to select from over two thousand other funds
through a brokerage service. 136 Although the “large menu” defense
has since lost some favor, as currently interpreted by courts, the
trust-based legal regime for 401(k) plans demands that plan
fiduciaries select, via a reasonably well-documented process,
investment options and service providers that are not, and do not
become, significantly or uniformly more expensive than industry
norms. 137 The recent wave of lawsuits reveals the challenges that
even large, sophisticated employers face in meeting this basic
standard. 138 And while the high dollar settlement amounts have
certainly piqued plan sponsor attention, such enforcement
strategies are not practical for the vast majority of smaller

payments to the plan trustee and administrator. Id. The Eighth Circuit agreed that information
about revenue sharing could be material because it “could influence a reasonable participant in
evaluating his or her options under the Plan.” Id. In Tibble, the Ninth Circuit focused on the
menu selection process in evaluating the prudence of the trustees’ decision to include retailclass shares of three specific mutual funds as investment options. In the absence of any
evidence that, as a matter of process, the fiduciaries considered the possibility of cheaper, but
otherwise similar, institutional classes for the funds, the court found the trustees in breach of
the fiduciary duty of prudence. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013).
135. See, e.g., Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In light
of the reasonable mix and range of investment options in the Unisys plan, plaintiffs’ factual
allegations about Unisys’s conduct do not plausibly support their claims.”); Loomis v. Exelon
Corp., 658 F.3d 667, 673–74 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[The plan sponsor] offered participants a
menu that includes high-expense, high-risk, and potentially high-return funds, together with
low-expense index funds that track the market, and low-expense, low-risk, modest-return bond
funds. It has left choice to the people who have the most interest in the outcome, and it
cannot be faulted for doing this.”).
136. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that because
the plan sponsor disclosed to the participants the total fees for the funds and directed the
participants to the fund prospectuses for information about the fund-level expenses, the
omission of information about the revenue-sharing arrangement was not material).
137. See, e.g., Stephen D. Rosenberg, Retreat from the High Water Mark: Breach of
Fiduciary Duty Claims Involving Excessive Fees After Tibble v. Edison International, 18 J.
PENSION BENEFITS 12 (2011).
138. See 401(k) Fee Cases, supra note 101.
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retirement plans and do little to ameliorate the limits of the
fiduciary obligation in the face of employer self-interest. 139
c. Employee complacency, lock-in, and lack of coordination. In
addition to the problems described above, the current fiduciarycentric regime may have the perverse consequence of making
employees more complacent and less vigilant of their “fiduciary”
employers, even though such “fiduciaries” may lack the necessary
expertise or have economic interests that conflict with the interests
of the employees. 140 At the same time, even if employees were more
vigilant, their enforcement options are limited as litigation is itself
costly and requires employees to overcome significant free-rider and
coordination problems. 141 Employees receive limited support from
the Department of Labor, which, in light of resource constraints, has
chosen to focus its enforcement efforts on breaches of objective
criteria, while leaving the higher-risk litigation over the “subjective”
fiduciary standards to private litigants. 142
Apart from employee litigation or agency oversight, the
employees of an employer who does not comply with ERISA’s
fiduciary requirements have no meaningful recourse. As the trust
“beneficiaries,” they are effectively locked in to their employer plans
and cannot avail themselves of alternative investment options

139. See, e.g., Sara Randazzo, Boeing Agrees to Settle 401(k) Plan Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.,
(Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-agrees-to-pay-57-million-to-settle-401k-plan-lawsuit-1446739640 (noting that Boeing’s $57 million settlement is the ninth
settlement that a single plaintiff’s firm has reached with large companies, resulting in more
than $271 million in payouts).
140. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 900
(2011) (warning that an overbroad application of fiduciary duties “could unnecessarily
constrain parties from self-protection in contractual relationships, impose excessive litigation
costs, provide an unsuitable basis for contracting, and impede developing fiduciary norms
of behavior”).
141. The class action and contingent fee mechanisms, though used against certain large
employers, may not be as effective for smaller employers where aggregate recoveries would be
smaller. See Sitkoff, supra note 10, at 580 (observing that “when liability rules are the chief
check on agency costs, there is a practical limit to the number of residual claimants that the
organization can effectively support. The greater the number, the more serious the collective
action dynamic that will weaken the incentive to monitor and then to bring litigation”).
142. Muir, supra note 60. As Muir acknowledges, the subjective and flexible nature of
the fiduciary standard enables it to serve as a kind-of regulatory “catchall.” These same
features, however, also make litigation over fiduciary standards relatively unpredictable
and costly. Id.
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without losing the tax benefits currently afforded to employersponsored plans. 143
B. Public Pension Plans
This Section turns to public pension plans. Structuring the
governance of public pension plans by analogy to private gratuitous
trusts ignores the economic realities of the relevant parties. Unlike
donative trust settlors, whose interests typically terminate upon trust
creation, the state and local governments that sponsor the pension
plans have ongoing interests in the pension trusts. They set the
payouts from the trusts, contribute assets into the trusts, decide on
certain investment parameters, and select and replace the trustees.
They reap personnel retention benefits from having the pension
plans, and also benefit if the successful investment of trust assets
reduces funding obligations. Employee participants, meanwhile,
benefit from trust payouts but also contribute their own assets into
the pension trusts. Public pension trustees, unlike their donative
trust counterparts, are replaced on an ongoing basis, often by
legislative appointment and occasionally by participant election.
The mismatch between the legal framework and the parties’
economic interests has undermined the effectiveness of trust-based
governance for public pensions, particularly with respect to the
funding of such trusts. Although U.S. pension trusts currently have
assets in excess of $2.4 trillion, the promised payouts exceed, by
conservative estimates, $3.2 trillion. 144 The funding gaps have
strained state and local government budgets—in some cases

143. A recent Wall Street Journal article emphasizes the lack of employee recourse over
poor employer decisions. See Liam Pleven, How to Lobby for a Better 401(k), WALL ST. J., (Feb.
20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-lobby-for-a-better-401-k-1424459507
(observing that while “many plans are hobbled by high fees and inadequate choices . . . few
people want to question the judgment of people who sign their paycheck and control
promotions and raises”).
144. Other estimates paint an even bleaker financial picture, estimating unfunded
liabilities for such plans to be as high as $5 trillion. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The
Crisis in Local Government Pensions in the United States, in GROWING OLD: PAYING FOR
RETIREMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL MONEY MANAGEMENT AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
(Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2011); see also Josh Rauh, Unfunded Pension Debts of U.S. States
(Aug.
25,
2015),
Still
Exceed
$3
Trillion,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/pensionresearchcouncil/2015/08/25/unfunded-pensiondebts-of-u-s-states-still-exceed-3-trillion/.
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precipitating municipal bankruptcy—and have spurred a wide range
of reform efforts. 145
The funding gap is, at least in part, the product of ongoing
“settlor” control over the pension trusts. In a typical donative trust,
after the settlor selects the trustee, the settlor relinquishes all legal
rights to the trust property and transfers control to the trustee. In
the case of public pension plans, however, even though the trustees
are charged with plan administration, the legislative “settlors” retain
a great deal of discretion over the trusts. State legislatures may
increase future payouts, withhold contributions, or dictate particular
investment strategies, but as the “settlors” of the pension trusts, they
do not have any fiduciary obligation to the plan participants or
beneficiaries. 146 Thus, some public employers have extended pension
promises to public employees while habitually skipping the necessary
contributions into the pension trusts, thereby ensuring that
promised payouts from the trusts exceed the available assets. 147
The plan trustees, meanwhile, have done little to stop them.
Notwithstanding their fiduciary obligations to the plan participants
and beneficiaries, public plan trustees lack the incentives to challenge
“settlor” decisions about the inflows and outflows of assets from the
trusts. 148 On the one hand, many of the trustees must answer to the
145. Vallejo, Central Falls, Stockton, Mammoth Lakes, and Detroit filed for bankruptcy
in part due to the burden of pension obligations. See, e.g., Elizabeth Trotta, Stockton Teeters on
Bankruptcy Edge, But City’s Not Alone, EXCHANGE (June 27, 2012, 3:00 PM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/%20stockton-teeters-bankruptcy-edge-citynot-alone-190026487.html. In the same period, most states scaled back pensions for new
employees, and a number of states reduced pension obligations to current employees and
retirees. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS
AND SUSTAINABILITY (2012).
146. Although the trustees generally control the investment of pension trust assets,
certain investment parameters may be set in state statutes, thus restricting trustee discretion. In
particular, to the extent that legislators assume a high rate-of-return on plan assets (which, if
met, would decrease employer funding obligations), the trustees are effectively bound to
investment strategies that expose plan assets to a relatively high degree of risk. See, e.g., Josh
Barro, Why Government Pension Funds Became Addicted to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/upshot/why-government-pension-funds-becameaddicted-to-risk.html?_r=0.
BUDGET
CRISIS
TASK
FORCE,
FINAL
REPORT
(2012),
147. STATE
http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms; see also Shnitser, supra note 64.
148. Isolated cases have held that pension trustees breach their fiduciary duties by not
protesting legislative “raids” on pension trust funds. Kaho`ohanohano v. State, 114 Haw. 302,
325 (2007) (citing Brisnehan v. Cent. Bank & Trust Co., 299 P.2d 113, 115 (Colo. 1956))
(“It is within the power, and is the duty, of a trustee to institute action and proceedings for the
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state legislators who appoint them and who have their own interests
in the pension trusts, interests that may not always align with those
of public employees. On the other hand, to the extent that public
pensions are still defined benefit plans that promise fixed payouts to
the participants, the trustees may reason that beneficiaries are not
immediately harmed by poor funding practices. 149 It is not terribly
surprising, therefore, that public plan trustees have rarely challenged
legislative attempts to withhold promised contributions or to
otherwise decrease the funded status of the trusts. Thus, the
fiduciary regime has been of limited consequence in ensuring that
promised payouts match available assets.
The fiduciary regime has likewise failed to ensure public trustee
monitoring of investment expenses. While the adoption of
diversification and prudence standards has limited investment
decisions based on factors other than financial returns to the plan,
public plan trustees have also demonstrated complacency with
respect to the investment expenses incurred by public pension plans.
There is growing evidence that as public plans have pursued
increasingly complex and costly investment strategies, they have
underperformed market benchmarks. 150

protection of the trust estate and the enforcement of claims and rights belonging thereto, and
to take all legal steps which may be reasonably necessary with relation to those objectives.”);
Dadisman v. Moore, 384 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1988) (“[F]ailure of the Respondent Trustees to
act in the face of these illegal legislative maneuvers and their compliance in channeling pension
trust dollars improperly into the general fund are breaches of their fiduciary duties.”).
149. The recent financial crisis has challenged this notion to some extent. Faced with
major funding gaps, most states have trimmed pension costs by increasing employee
contributions, raising age and tenure requirements, adjusting benefit formulas, and reducing
or terminating cost-of-living increases. See, e.g., NASRA, SELECTED APPROVED CHANGES TO
STATE PUBLIC PENSIONS TO RESTORE OR PRESERVE PLAN SUSTAINABILITY (2015).
150. See, e.g., Alexandra Stevenson, Calpers’s Disclosure on Fees Brings Surprise, and
TIMES,
June
25,
2015,
Scrutiny,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/business/dealbook/calperss-disclosure-on-feesbrings-surprise-and-scrutiny.html; Gretchen Morgenson, Pension Funds Can Only Guess at
TIMES,
May
1,
2015,
Private
Equity’s
Cost,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/business/pension-funds-can-only-guess-at-privateequitys-cost.html; Editorial, New York’s Leaky Public Pension Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13,
2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/opinion/new-yorks-leaky-public-pensionfunds.html; Gretchen Morgenson, How to Pay Millions and Lag Behind the Market, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/20/business/how-to-paymillions-and-lag-behind-the-market.html; Jenny Anderson, Pension Funds Still Waiting for Big
TIMES,
Apr.
2,
2010,
Payoff
From
Private
Equity,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03equity.html.
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Employee oversight has also been lacking, even though public
employees receive the pension benefits as a form of deferred
compensation and are required to contribute portions of their
salaries into the pension trusts. As contributors of assets into the
trust, such employees are, under traditional trust principles, the
“settlors” of the trusts. But because the current regulatory regime
regards employees only as trust beneficiaries, public employees have
limited control over the management of trust assets and lack exit
rights from the trusts. At the same time, while the traditional
donative trust gives locked-in beneficiaries the incentives to monitor
the trustees, the public pension arrangement dilutes the incentives
for any such oversight. To the extent that public pension plans
purport to shelter employees from both the upside and the downside
of trustee management, the employees, though unable to sell or
transfer their interests, have limited incentives to actively monitor the
funding and investment decisions made for the plan.
The courts have been reluctant to enforce any kind of funding
discipline. Participant lawsuits challenging legislative and executive
acts that decreased funding levels have been repeatedly struck
down. 151 The primary rationale has been that beneficiaries may be
entitled to specific benefits but are not entitled to any specific
funding methods or levels. 152 Courts have held that participants have

151. See, e.g.¸ New Jersey Educ. Ass’n v. State, 989 A.2d 282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010) cert. denied, 997 A.2d 232 (N.J. 2010) (holding that although pension funding statutes
contained the word “shall” with respect to contribution amounts to be paid by the state, the
employees did not have a constitutionally protected contract right to the funding method
adopted by the legislature). In 2011, the state legislature added a statutory requirement that
the legislature make a specific annual contribution to state pension plans. After the governor
twice reduced the state contributions, plan members sued. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
struck down the statutory provision for violating the Debt Limitation Clause of the New Jersey
Constitution. See also Jones v. Bd. of Tr. of Ky. Ret. Sys., 910 S.W.2d 710 (1995) (holding that
the legislation creating the retirement system created an inviolable contract between members
and the state for the provision of retirement benefits, but it did not deny the General Assembly
the ability to determine the means in providing the pension funds); People ex rel. Ill. Fed’n of
Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749 (Ill. 1975) (holding that neither the Illinois
constitutional provision that membership in state pension or retirement system shall be an
enforceable contractual relationship the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired
nor the Pension Code established contractual right to enforce specific level of funding or
precluded governor’s item reduction of appropriations to the pension funds).
152. In Burgos v. State, the court distinguished its rejection of a statutory funding
scheme from a recent Supreme Court of Illinois decision that struck down a reduction of
pension benefits. 118 A.3d 270, 283 (N.J. 2015) cert. denied sub nom. New Jersey Educ. Ass’n
v. New Jersey, 136 S. Ct. 1156 (2016) and cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1156 (2016).
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no standing to challenge particular funding strategies unless there is
an imminent risk to their benefits. 153
At present, U.S. public pension plans face serious long-term
funding shortages and critical questions about the security of
promised benefits. 154 Although the future of public pensions is
uncertain, public employers are beginning to experiment with
alternative arrangements that follow the private sector in shifting
funding and investment risk to employees. 155 As the economic
realities of retirement savings shift, the legal regime for such savings
can no longer reflect the pension arrangements that existed half a
century ago.
V. ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES FOR RETIREMENT SAVINGS
In light of the shortcoming of trust-based governance discussed
above, this Section turns to a consideration of long-term reforms to
promote retirement security in the Unites States. As the defined
contribution model gains traction for both public and private sector
employees, 156 the challenge for policymakers is to foster universal

153. In People ex rel., Sklodowski v. State, 695 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1998), the court observed
that a beneficiary need not wait until benefits are actually diminished to bring suit under the
protection clause of the state constitution, but would have to show that the funds are “on the
verge of default or imminent bankruptcy such that benefits are in immediate danger of being
diminished.” In Kaho‘ohanohano v. State, 162 P.3d 696 (Haw. 2007), the court suggested that
employees would have to show that they have “not received any pension benefit to which he
or she is entitled” or an “immediate threat that the pension fund will become insolvent”
(quoting Ret. Bd. of the Emps. Ret. Sys. of Providence v. Cianci, 722 A.2d 1196, 1198
(R.I. 1999).
154. See, e.g., Mary Walsh Williams, Bankruptcy Judge in California Challenges Sanctity
of Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/judgerules-that-bankruptcy-invalidates-calpers-lien-against-stockton-calif/; Alan Greenblatt, Deal In
Detroit Could Signal Cuts To Pensions Elsewhere, NPR (July 22, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/2014/07/22/334054904/deal-in-detroit-could-signal-cuts-topensions-elsewhere.
155. See, e.g., Alicia H. Munnell et al., Defined Contribution Plans in the Public Sector:
An Update, CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE (Apr. 2014),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/SLP_37.pdf.
156. See Matthew Hoops, Irina Stefanescu & Ivan Vidangos, Defined-Contribution
Pension Plans for State and Local Government Employees in the Financial Accounts of the United
NOTES
(Apr.
20,
2015),
States,
FEDS
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015/defined-contributionpension-plans-for-state-and-local-government-employees-20150420.html (observing that
“401(k)-style defined-contribution (DC) plans have increasingly become available to S&L
government employees”); John Beshears et al., Behavioral Economics Perspectives on Public
Sector Pension Plans, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 315 (2011) (noting that “fiscal pressures
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access to low-cost retirement savings products that will help U.S.
workers accumulate adequate assets for retirement. 157 Section V.A.
begins by reviewing prior academic recommendations, as well as
recent state and federal government reforms, that seek to realign
employer, employee, and government responsibilities in the
provision of retirement and healthcare benefits. Although the various
fixes appear quite different on first glance, a closer review suggests
that they all seek to move away from the donative trust paradigm,
and to limit employer discretion in the provision and administration
of pension and welfare benefits. Building on the themes from prior
proposals, the lessons from the regulation of investment companies,
and the insights from behavioral economics, Section V.B. outlines a
proposal—and a research agenda—for an alternative regulatory
framework for retirement savings in the United States.
A. A Range of Current Reform Proposals with a Common Theme
The starting point for any consideration of reform must be the
federal subsidization of retirement benefits. With federal tax
expenditures for retirement programs exceeding $100 billion in
2013, there is a clear role for the federal regulation of retirement
savings. 158 The critical questions pertain to the scope and the form of
federal regulation and, accordingly, to the magnitude of necessary
reform. Prior academic proposals vary across all of these dimensions.
Some advocate for greater federal regulation of pension plans
through additional rules mandating certain investments or
disclosures, or, in the extreme, requiring mandatory employer and
employee contributions to individual retirement accounts. 159 Others

are likely to generate more movement” toward defined contribution plans in the public
sector). Furthermore, Edward Zelinsky observes that “any program for the future must start
with the acknowledgment that the private retirement system going forward will predominantly
reflect the defined contribution paradigm.” See supra note 52, at 523.
157. The proposed framework would not address the existing underfunding of public
pension plans but would help prevent the accumulation of such unfunded liabilities in
the future.
158. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017 (2013).
159. See Kwak, supra note 87 (proposing to limit the 404(c) safe harbor to “plans that
only include low-cost index funds”); Ayres & Curtis, supra note 87, at 1522 (recommending
that “plans with average plan and fund level costs that exceed the average expense ratios of a
mixed portfolio of index funds by 125 basis points” be labeled as “high-cost” plans); Teresa
Ghilarducci, Our Ridiculous Approach to Retirement, Op. Ed., N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2012
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suggest stronger enforcement through enhanced fiduciary
obligations for plan trustees 160 or certain exit rights for
beneficiaries. 161 Still others advocate for the shifting of fiduciary
responsibility away from individual employers and onto third-party
financial service providers 162 or separate entities established to
administer plans on behalf of multiple employers. 163 In the public
sphere, proposals advocate for stronger “fiscal constitutions” to
ensure the disciplined funding of promised pension benefits 164 or the
outsourcing of long-term pension liabilities to private
insurance companies. 165
At the same time, both state and the federal government are
pursuing alternatives to employer-based health and retirement
benefits. While ERISA imposes the same trust-based framework on
health and pension benefits, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) signals an important departure from
ERISA’s trust-based approach, whose fiduciary standards proved
grossly ineffective in regulating the administration of employersponsored welfare plans. 166 The PPACA limits employer discretion

(proposing a system of mandatory “guaranteed retirement accounts on top of Social Security,”
which would be “professionally managed, come with a guaranteed rate of return and pay
out annuities”).
160. See Adams, supra note 86, at 358; Muir, supra note 86, at 552; Tucker, supra note
86, at 215.
161. Ayres & Curtis, supra note 87, at 1519–20 (arguing that employees should have an
avenue to withdraw from “high-cost” plans).
162. See, e.g., Muir, supra note 61, at 55 (drawing on the Australian experience to
recommend that “fiduciary responsibility for default investments be reallocated from
employers to the financial services firms that offer those investment vehicles”). Importantly,
however, it is not clear that the mere imposition of the fiduciary label in this context would be
sufficient to constrain the behavior of financial services firms. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort,
Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 442 (2010) (“At bottom, the fiduciary label
just does not fit a sales-based industry very well.”).
163. Sean Forbes, Senate HELP Subcommittee Hearing on Small-Business Retirement
Plan Options, 42 PENS. & BEN. REP. 1897 (2015) (summarizing congressional testimony in
favor of multiple employer plans (MEPs) that, as separate entities, would take on fiduciary
liability for plans covering participating employers).
164. Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public
Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 117 (2015) (advocating for the creation of “enforcement
mechanisms that can, where appropriate, override legislative decisions to underfund public
pension plans”).
165. See, e.g., The Secure Annuities for Employees Retirement Act, S. 1270, 113th
Cong. (2013).
166. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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over healthcare benefits while harnessing technology to give
individuals the tools to understand and compare insurance plans.
The federal government has also recently introduced the
“myRA” retirement savings vehicle, a product that U.S. Treasury
Department has marketed to “people looking for a simple, safe, and
affordable way to start saving for retirement.” 167 The myRA is free to
open, has no asset minimum, no fees, and permits investment in only
one type of government securities. 168 Although the program is not
likely to have a big impact in terms of asset value—only $15,000 can
be saved through the myRA—it represents a critical departure from
the ERISA framework. 169 Most notably, the myRA is available
irrespective of one’s employment status and limits employer
participation to the remittance of payroll deductions. 170
At the state level, there has been rapidly growing momentum for
state-sponsored retirement savings plans for non-public employees
without access to employer-sponsored plans. 171 Although the
proposals vary in the exact mechanics, in general, all seek to provide
a state-administered plan for private-sector employees 172 Like federal
healthcare reform and the myRA effort, the state-level reforms aim
to disentangle access to retirement savings plans from employment
status and from the preferences of particular employers. In 2015, the
Department of Labor expressed its support for such programs, and
for a variety of novel initiatives—including state marketplaces and
state-administered multiple-employer plans—to increase employee
coverage while limiting employer involvement. 173
Across both the proposed and enacted reforms, the common
theme has been the limitation of employer discretion over the
167. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Get Answers: Frequently asked questions, downloads, and
additional resources., MYRA, https://myra.gov/get-answers/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., States as Innovators, GEO. U. CENTER FOR RETIREMENT INITIATIVES,
http://cri.georgetown.edu/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2016) (noting that “since 2012, more than
25 states have considered proposals to study or establish state sponsored plans.”).
172. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-556, FEDERAL ACTION
COULD HELP STATE EFFORTS TO EXPAND PRIVATE SECTOR COVERAGE, (2015),
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-556.
173. Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80
Fed. Reg. 72006 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510);
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs that Sponsor or Facilitate Plans
Covered by ERISA, 80 Fed. Reg. 71936 (2015).
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provision and administration of health and retirement benefits. This
theme reflects the growing recognition that neither private nor
public employers are well-suited to take on the “settlor” or “trustee”
roles that the current trust-based framework imposes on them (and
certainly not both roles at once). Building on this theme, Section
V.B. presents a proposal to restructure the employer, employee, and
government roles in the provision and management of retirement
assets. The aim is to ameliorate the shortcomings of the current
system while preserving both the distinction with the Social Security
system and the key elements of individual and employer choice.
B. A Research Agenda for Long-Term Reforms
In place of the current system of employer-sponsored plans
administered by conflicted employer fiduciaries, this Article proposes
a national system of individual retirement savings accounts to be
regulated not by analogy to gift transfers, but increasingly as
products subject to safety and standards regulation. 174 The pillars of
the new system would be (1) the elimination of employer
intermediaries in plan creation and administration, (2) the
standardization of investment products and associated expenses, and
(3) the establishment of participant exit rights. Each new pillar of the
system—and of the research agenda on pension reform 175—is
discussed in broad strokes below.
174. Unlike the proposed state-level systems, a national system would preserve ERISA’s
central goal of “avoid[ing] a multiplicity of regulation” in order to facilitate a “nationally
uniform administration of employee benefit plans.” N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 646 (1995).
175. Other countries’ experiences with individual account models, similar to the
individual account model described herein, should be considered in further analysis. Sweden,
Chile, the United Kingdom, and Canada, among others, have all adopted various forms of the
individual-account defined-contribution model in which employers and employees make
contributions into portable accounts for which the employees control the selection of service
providers and investment options. See, e.g., OECD, IOPS Country Profiles – United Kingdom
GOV’T
(Dec.
2009),
http://www.iopsweb.org/resources/44875825.pdf;
U.S.
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-556, FEDERAL ACTION COULD HELP STATE EFFORTS TO
EXPAND PRIVATE SECTOR COVERAGE, (2015), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15556.; Barbara E. Kritzer, Chile’s Next Generation Pension Reform, 68 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 69
(2008); Annika Sundén, How Do Individual Accounts Work in the Swedish Pension System?,
CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. (Aug. 2004); Facts and Myths About the Premium
Pension, SWEDISH INV. FUND ASS’N (2013); Rick Baert, Canada Officially Launches Pooled
DC Plans for Employees in Private Sector, Territories, PENSIONS & INVS. (Oct. 7, 2014); About
Pooled Registered Pension Plans (PRPPs), CANADA REVENUE AGENCY (July 3, 2014),
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/rgstrd/prpp-rpac/bt-eng.html.
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1. The elimination of employer intermediaries in plan creation
and administration
Pursuant to an individual account model, employers and
employees would remit contributions to the employees’ federally
established retirement savings accounts, which would segregate
individual savings in a single account throughout an employee’s preretirement years. 176 Employers could continue to make dollar
contributions on behalf of employees (a benefit that prospective
employees could easily evaluate in assessing total compensation), but
would only be required to facilitate employee contributions through
payroll withholding. Employers would no longer serve as pension
plan administrators, and thus would not have to invest any resources
in or face any liability risk for the establishment or management of
pension plans. 177 The absence of such costs and liability risks would
likely encourage contributions by a wide range of employers,
including a significant portion of U.S. employers who do not
currently sponsor any retirement plans.
2. The standardization of investment products and associated expenses
Under the proposed individual account model, individual
participants would, as they do now, select particular investment
funds for the assets in their retirement accounts. To harness the
power of consumer choice with respect to retirement products, two
key departures from the current model would be required. First, as
described in the section below, participants would need the freedom
to “exit” from particular investment funds. Secondly, and in order to

176. Like current 401(k) type arrangements, the individual accounts would segregate
such assets and protect them from employer or employee bankruptcy.
177. How and by whom would the individual accounts be administered in the absence
of employer intermediaries? Here, the experience of individual account systems outside the
U.S. provides a spectrum of possible arrangements—with varying degrees of involvement by
the federal government—to be analyzed in further research. On one end of the spectrum, the
U.S. could pursue the Chilean model in which the management of individual retirement
savings accounts would be delegated to private companies, a model that would also resemble
the current U.S. approach to 529 college savings plans. Kritzer, supra note 175; I.R.C. § 529
(2012). On the other end of the spectrum, the U.S. government, which already administers
individual accounts for purposes of the Social Security system, could pursue the Sweden model
in which the federal government would itself administer the individual accounts with the aim
of keeping administrative costs down by drawing on economies of scale in administration.
Sundén, supra note 175; Facts and Myths About The Premium Pension, supra note 175.
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make individual participation feasible, the investment funds offered
to participants would have to be standardized. 178
At present, employer intermediation limits standardization.
Investment fund providers commonly seek to provide additional
services to plan sponsors and seek compensation for such services
through the increasingly complicated revenue and cost-sharing
arrangements. Different employers have different service providers,
different bundles of services, and different cost-sharing
arrangements. The widely acknowledged result is that neither the
employers nor the employees nor third-party observers can directly
or accurately compare the total cost of the investment options across
different employer plans. 179
Beyond eliminating employer intermediation, the individual
account model would strive to simplify and standardize the
investment products offered to individual account holders. Although
further research is necessary to determine the appropriate size of the
investment menu, at the outset, permissible investments could be
limited primarily to mutual funds. 180 Investment fund providers
seeking to access retirement assets held in individual accounts would
have to comply with standards concerning the structure of
compensation arrangements, and with specific disclosure
requirements with respect to fund fees and returns. 181 Furthermore,
the use of labels to certify particular types of investment products
could aid participants, just as such labels permit consumers to shop

178. See Sendhil Mullainathan, Why Investing Is So Complicated, and How to Make It
Simpler, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2015 (observing that “standardization is what allows
uninformed consumers to shop intelligently for complex products”). Mullainathan suggests
that “for mutual funds, better standards and better labels could simplify choice. For example,
suppose the label ‘Standard S&P 500 Index Fund’ was widely used to mean that the fund
satisfied certain criteria about transparent pricing, low management fees and limits on trading
costs. Consumers buying this fund would know what they were getting.” Id.
179. See, e.g.¸ Maher, supra note 60, at 46–48 (describing the inability of prospective
employees to effectively compare retirement packages across different employers).
180. At their core, mutual funds are an inexpensive way for individual investors to own
stakes in portfolios of securities, with at least half of U.S. households already holding shares in
one or more mutual funds. See William A. Birdthistle, The Supreme Court’s Theory of the Fund,
37 J. CORP. L. 771, 772 (2012).
181. Sweden is a particularly compelling example in this regard. The total fee for
individual accounts consists of just two parts: a money management fee and a fixed
administrative fee charged by the federal agency. See Sundén, supra note 175; Facts And Myths
About The Premium Pension, supra note 175.
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for complex products outside the investment sphere. 182 Finally, the
existence of a uniform market for retirement savings products would
foster the development of far more robust consumer ratings and
reviews by third parties, as well as new technologies to assist with
consumer decision-making. 183
3. The establishment of participant exit rights
In a fundamental departure from the current trust-based model,
the individual account model would no longer “lock in” participants
into the plan menus selected by particular employers. Indeed, under
the current structure, employee participants in employer-sponsored
plans may be at a disadvantage relative to non-plan investors.
Outside employer-sponsored plans, mutual fund investors who are
unhappy with any aspect of the fund can exit by redeeming their
shares for the cash value of the proportionate share of the underlying
fund assets. 184 Mutual fund managers are therefore judged by the
forces of “consumer sovereignty.” 185 As in other settings where the
shareholders can vote with their feet, “[n]et inflows of money” serve
as the perceived “proper metric for testing product quality” 186 and

182. Mullainathan, supra note 178.
183. In recent years, start-ups seeking to help consumers assess the investment options in
their 401(k)s have appeared on the market. The value of such companies, however, has been
limited in light of the participant lock-in under the current trust-based structure. See, e.g.,
Catherine Shu, FeeX Raises $6.5M Series B To Identify Hidden Fees In Users’ Retirement
Accounts, TECHCRUNCH.COM, (Aug. 21, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/08/21/feexraises-6-5m-series-b-to-identify-hidden-fees-in-users-retirement-accounts/; see also Uri
Berliner, Would You Let A Robot Manage Your Retirement Savings?, NPR, (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/20/445337189/would-you-let-a-robot-manage-yourretirement-savings.
184. Notably, though the majority of mutual funds are organized as trusts under state
law, the exit options available to mutual fund investors alter the basic character of the trust and
the incentives of the parties to the trust. Absent the lock-in that characterizes beneficiary
interests in a donative trust, mutual fund investors are no longer dependent on fiduciary
obligations to protect their interests from abuse by trustees. Nor do such investors have the
incentives to exercise any kind of “corporate governance” type rights that the Investment
Company Act of 1940 provides. Incentives to bring litigation against the fund are likewise very
limited. Instead, given the low-cost of exit, investors in mutual funds who are unhappy with
trustee performance (or costs) can simply redeem their shares and move their assets elsewhere.
See generally Morley & Curtis, supra note 81, at 84.
185. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1038 (2005).
186. Id.
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foster “a kind of product market competition.” 187 Such competition
is admittedly still imperfect, 188 but in combination with product-style
regulation to improve standardization and transparency, it has the
potential to harness the disciplining power of consumer choice in the
marketplace for financial investments.
To be clear, the model proposed in this Article does not advocate
for unrestricted or unguided individual control over the investment
and accumulation of retirement assets. 189 Rather, having shown that
employers do not—and should not be expected to—act solely in the
interest of their employees, the individual account framework aims to
shift certain administrative and oversight functions to the federal
government while simultaneously standardizing the underlying
arrangements to foster effective competition among investment
funds. As it has done in other countries, the aggregation of
individual account information and centralized administration of
such accounts would facilitate the analysis of investor behavior 190 and
experimentation with default rules and “nudges” to improve such
behavior. 191 Furthermore, as in other product markets, private-sector
firms can be expected to utilize technological advances to provide
sophisticated comparisons and ratings to guide consumer choice.
Finally, whereas current employers do not wish to be in the business
187. Morley & Curtis, supra note 81, at 89.
188. Id. at 129–32.
189. Several studies have documented that individual investors are subject to various
behavioral biases. For a brief overview of relevant studies, see Ning Tang et al., The Efficiency
of Sponsor and Participant Portfolio Choices In 401(K) Plans. 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073 (2010);
see also Brown et al., supra note 102.
190. See, e.g., Johan Almenberg & Jenny Save-Söderbergh, Financial Literacy and
Retirement Planning in Sweden, 10 J. PEN. ECON. & FIN. 585 (2011) (using data from the
Swedish Financial Supervisory 2010 consumer survey to look at levels of ﬁnancial literacy and
retirement planning in the Swedish population). The consolidation of pension savings into a
single account has also promoted awareness of pension savings in several European countries.
See Iona Bain, Platform to Track Pensions Logical Step Forward: Report, FTADVISER,
(Oct. 9, 2013).
191. For example, the system could enable the comparison of individual performance to
the investment performance of other participants (either from the same employer, of the same
age, etc.). See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (advocating for a system of
automatic enrollment and contribution increases, subject to employee opt-out). Both Chile
and Sweden, for example, have adjusted the initial system design to improve default options
and promote competition among investment product providers. See, e.g., International
Update, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (June 2010) (discussing the change in the default funds); Kritzer,
supra note 175 (discussing changes to increase individual participation rates and improve
competition among private pension fund management companies).
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of educating employees about prudent investment practices, 192 a
federal account administrator or agency specifically tasked with
improving retirement savings outcomes could engage in a much
more significant education campaign. 193
VI. CONCLUSION
Decades after the donative trust was adopted as the
organizational model for the then prominent defined-benefit plans,
this Article evaluates the suitability of the model for current
retirement savings arrangements. The findings reveal that regulation
by analogy to the donative trust is increasingly incoherent and
incapable of ensuring that employees have access to sound
investment opportunities for their retirement savings. At a time
when the role of the employer with respect to the provision of
various welfare benefits, including healthcare, is undergoing
important changes, this Article calls for the limitation of the
employer role in the structuring and management of pension
benefits financed by employee earnings. As a long-term alternative,
this Article proposes a framework for developing a national system of
individual retirement savings accounts into which both employers
and employees could continue to make tax-advantaged
contributions. As they do now, individuals would control the
selection of investments for the assets in their accounts, but they
would do so in a marketplace that would facilitate direct comparison
and competition among the investment products on which U.S.
employees depend for a financially secure retirement.

192. An employer who sponsors a participant-directed 401(k) plan is not required to
provide educational materials on retirement savings and investing to the plan participants and
employers generally fear the fiduciary liability that could attach in connection with the
provision of investment education. See 15 No. 9 Thompson’s 401(k) Handbook Newsl. 2
(observing that “many employers fear the liability that such financial education might create”).
193. The U.S. Department of Treasury’s campaign to promote and educate the public
about myRAs could be instructive. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Help Us Build a
Nation of Savers, MYRA, https://myra.gov/partners/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2015). An
education campaign could also be undertaken in coordination with or under the auspices of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which is currently “weighing whether it should
take on a role in helping Americans manage the $19.4 trillion they have put into retirement
savings” See Carter Dougherty, Retirement Savings Accounts Draw U.S. Consumer Bureau
Attention, BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 17, 2013.
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